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[W]e will not sacrifice substance to form.
- William Blackstone,
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, executives from "Big Tobacco"-industry leaders
Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown and Williamson Tobacco, and
Lorillard 2-appeared before Congress and denied that nicotine is
addictive despite internal documents disclosing a long history of
industry-wide awareness about the addictive nature of the drug.3 One
executive even denied that smoking causes death despite the well-
established scientific consensus to the contrary.4
Worse still, tobacco companies had consciously targeted
children as young as fourteen-years-old in their advertising schemes.
In an internal R.J. Reynolds memorandum to Vice President of
Marketing C.A. Tucker, J.F. Hind wrote: "To ensure increased and
longer-term growth for CAMEL FILTER, the brand must increase its
share penetration among the 14-24 age group which have a new set of
more liberal values and which represent tomorrow's cigarette
business."5 The popular cartoon character "Joe Camel" was born soon
thereafter. Philip Morris shared the same marketing strategy; in an
internal research report, a research executive for Philip Morris wrote
that "[t]oday's teenager is tomorrow's potential regular customer." 6
1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122, *127.
2. On July 30, 2004, R.J. Reynolds acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco in a horizontal
divestiture for $3.2 billion. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., MERGERSTAT, M&A DATABASE,
June 28, 2005, Deal No. 230844, https://www.mergerstat.com/newsite/. Liggett Group, the "runt
of the litter," could also be included in "Big Tobacco," although Liggett's market share is
significantly smaller than the others. MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE
LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO 315 (1999). At the end of 1996,
the companies' respective market shares were: Philip Morris, 47.8 percent; R.J. Reynolds, 24.6
percent; Brown & Williamson, 17.2 percent; Lorillard, 8.4 percent; other companies, 2 percent.
W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POST-MORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 39 (2002).
3. Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at 1
(discussing internal tobacco-industry documents disclosing the addictive nature of nicotine and
tobacco executives' statements to Congress denying its addictive nature).
4. Marlene Cimons, Cigarette Chiefs Steadfastly Deny Smoking Kills, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1994, at Al.
5. Memorandum from J.F. Hind to C.A. Tucker, Vice President of Marketing, R.J.
Reynolds (Jan. 23, 1975), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ftc-rjr/CX000052.html.
6. RESEARCH CTR., PHILIP MORRIS, YOUNG SMOKERS: PREVALENCE, TRENDS, IMPLICATIONS,
AND RELATED DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1 (1981) [hereinafter YOUNG SMOKERS], available at
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The misdeeds of Big Tobacco have been reported extensively by
the media in an understandably negative light.7 The label "merchants
of death" has been etched into popular culture as a particularly
appropriate appellation for not only Big Tobacco executives, but also
lobbyists who assist the industry.8 This characterization contrasts
starkly with descriptions of those who challenge the tobacco industry,
who are often presented as heroes, lionized by both the media and
legal scholars as David-types battling the great Goliath.9
The most important legal challenge to Big Tobacco came from
Michael Moore, a lawyer who decided to "make a difference."' 0 As
attorney general of Mississippi, Moore was selected as the "Lawyer of
the Year" and graced the cover of the National Law Journal in 1997.11
Underneath a caricature of Moore, the caption on the cover read,
"Mississippi Attorney General Michael C. Moore took on Big Tobacco
and came out smokin.' "12 Moore, described as "[a]mbitious and
charismatic," was praised by the National Law Journal for his
http://tobaccodocuments.org/usc-tim/108.html. For background on the tobacco industry's
advertising to children, see generally CLETE SNELL, PEDDLING POISON: THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY
AND KIDS 19-36 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Myron Levin, New Tobacco Records: Did Industry Know Risks Early?, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at 1 (discussing internal Philip Morris documents disclosing use of
insecticides in cigarette production); John Mintz & Saundra Torry, Internal R.J. Reynolds
Documents Detail Cigarette Marketing Aimed at Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at A01
(discussing the Tucker Memo and other internal R.J. Reynolds documents about advertising
aimed at children); John Schwartz, Pesticides in Older Cigarettes, Papers Say, WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 1997, at A04 (discussing internal documents disclosing use of pesticides and other hazardous
chemicals in cigarette production); Henry Weinstein, R.J. Reynolds Targeted Kids, Records
Show, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at Al (reporting on the Tucker Memo).
8. See, e.g., Joan Beck, Ruining the 'Merchants of Death, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 12, 1998, at
C15 (referring to Steven F. Goldstone, then-CEO of RJR Nabisco, as "an evil man . . . the
merchant of death and illness who heads RJR Nabsico"); Editorial, Influential Mercenaries Join
Big Tobacco's Army, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Sept. 7, 1997, at J2 (referring to tobacco lobbyists
who take "blood money" as "merchants of death"); Mike Littwin, The Tobacco Cartel Lights a Fire
Under a Sorry Network, BALT. SUN, Aug. 23, 1995, at ID (referring to "Philip Morris, Reynolds
Tobacco and the other merchants of death"); Paul Vitello, The True Face of Philip Morris,
NEWSDAY, July 22, 2001, at A08 (referring to Philip Morris as "dropp[ing] its mask of
philanthropy, revealing beneath something else. Call it what you like. An unabashed merchant
of death is one possibility.').
9. See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the
Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 473, 478 (1998) (referring to Mike
Lewis, who brought the idea of Medicaid recoupment suits to Michael Moore, as "[o]ne of the
heroes of the tobacco war").
10. OREY, supra note 2, at 239.
11. The Year in Review, Lawyer of the Year: Michael C. Moore, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 29, 1997, at
B7 [hereinafter The Year in Review]. Moore became Attorney General of Mississippi in 1988.
Peter J. Boyer, The Yuppies of Mississippi: How They Took Over the Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 1988, at 24.
12. The Year in Review, supra note 11.
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political and personal courage; "Moore Did Good Like an Attorney
General Should," read the secondary headline.13
What did Moore do to deserve such lavish praise? In 1994,
Mississippi, with Moore at the helm, was the first state to bring a
Medicaid-recoupment suit against Big Tobacco. 14
Established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act ("the
Act"), Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides medical
assistance to needy families.15 Today, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have Medicaid programs. 6 Mississippi's suit sought
reimbursement from Big Tobacco for the costs of treating tobacco-
related disease through its Medicaid program. "It is only fair," Moore
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 2010)).
When a state decides to participate in the Medicaid program, it must provide medical assistance
to (1) all individuals who receive other assistance from the State, such as old-age assistance,
benefits for the blind and permanently and totally disabled, or AFDC benefits; (2) all individuals
who receive Supplemental Security Income benefits; (3) all individuals who are "severely
impaired" under § 1396d(q) of the Act; certain "qualified" pregnant women or children, defined in
§ 1396d(n); (4) all pregnant women with infants under a year old whose family income does not
exceed 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level; (5) all "qualified" family members, defined in §
1396d(m)(1); (6) all children between the ages of one and six whose family income does not
exceed 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level; and (7) all children born after September 30,
1983, between the ages of six and nineteen, whose family income does not exceed 133 percent of
the Federal Poverty Level. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VII). The specific number of
categories could be more or less than the seven listed here, depending on the level of generality
used to formulate the categories. Some commentators group the above categories into only three:
"(1) single-parent families who are eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") and low-income elderly, blind, and disabled individuals who qualify for Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI"); (2) low-income pregnant women and children who cannot receive cash
assistance and low-income pregnant women and children who do not qualify for welfare but have
large medical or long-term care expenses; and (3) low-income Medicare beneficiaries who are
unable to afford deductibles or premiums of Medicare Part B, or the cost of medical care not
covered by Medicare." Andrew R. Gardella, Note, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority
of Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the Medicaid
Act Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 710 (2008). For the political climate
surrounding the passage of Title XIX, see JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE'S MEDICINE:
MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965, at 48-51 (2006).
The Act further specifies the type of "medical assistance" a state must provide. At a
minimum, the state must provide (1) inpatient hospital services, (2) outpatient hospital services,
(3) laboratory and X-ray services, (4) nursing facility services, (5) physician services, (6) services
furnished by a nurse-midwife, and (7) services furnished by a pediatric nurse-practitioner. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21); see also id. § 1396(a)(10)(A) (explaining that these
subsections of § 1396(d) constitute the required medical assistance that states must provide).
16. While no state is required to have a Medicaid program, the Act encourages states to
enact such programs "as far as practicable." ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE
MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 57 (1974).
1084
BIG TOBACCO, SMOKERS, AND MEDICAID
said, "for the industry that primarily caused the damage to pay for
it." 17
And Big Tobacco paid mightily: the industry settled the
Mississippi suit for $3.6 billion.18 Other states, using the Mississippi
complaint as a model, soon filed their own lawsuits. Big Tobacco
settled individually with three other states, and in 1998 the
companies and the remaining forty-six states, the District of
Columbia, and five U.S. territories executed the Master Settlement
Agreement ("MSA"), settling the rest of their claims. 19 The reported
value of the settlement for the first twenty-five years is $206 billion,
although the tobacco companies must continue to make annual
payments of $9 billion a year into perpetuity even after the initial
$206 billion.20 Moore's work thus led to a truly "landmark outcome":
an industry that had been virtually untouched throughout almost fifty
years of litigation agreed to pay amounts that make even the largest
tort-liability judgments seem trivial.21 While not quite a knockout,
Moore's legal punch landed Big Tobacco on the mat for a standing
eight count. 22
The only problem with Moore's triumph is that it violated-and
continues to violate-federal law. By structuring the MSA so that
tobacco companies can pass on most of their costs to their consumers
(i.e., smokers), the settlement effectively causes Medicaid-covered
smokers to pay for their own benefits, a condition unequivocally
barred by the Social Security Act.
This Note examines the relationship between the MSA,
Medicaid-covered smokers, and the Social Security Act and shows how
the MSA violates the Act by forcing Medicaid-covered smokers to pay
de facto premiums for their Medicaid coverage. After a brief
description of the history of tobacco litigation, Part II examines the
economic and regulatory terms of the MSA. Part III presents a new
17. Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and Protect
Children, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 53.
18. Memorandum of Understanding, In re Moore ex rel. State Tobacco Litig., No. 94-1429
(Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County July 2, 1997), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites/all/
files/ucsfassets/mssettlement.pdf; see also VIScuSI, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing the $3.6
billion settlement).
19. Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 1998), available at http://www.naag.org/backpages
/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdflMSA%20with%2OSig%2OPages%20and%2OExhibits.pdflfileview.
20. Id. at 44-66.
21. W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 523
(1999).
22. On Big Tobacco's profit increases post-MSA, see, for example, Stuart J. Fowler & William
F. Ford, Has a Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Settlement Helped the Tobacco Industry?, 28 J. EcON. &
FIN. 430, 433 (2004).
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characterization of the MSA as a violation of the Act's restrictions on
premiums. Following the MSA, tobacco companies passed the costs of
the MSA to smokers in the form of cigarette-price increases. Part III
examines the transactions between Medicaid-covered smokers, Big
Tobacco, and the states in light of the principle that substance
prevails over form. Applying this principle, the payments made by Big
Tobacco to the states can be characterized as payments made by
smokers to the states. Medicaid-covered smokers make de facto
payments, best construed as premiums, to the states for their own
Medicaid coverage, which violates the Social Security Act. Part IV
evaluates three options to address the problem created by the MSA. In
the end, this Note concludes that Medicaid-covered smokers may be
presented with a choice: either quit smoking or continue paying
unlawful de facto premiums for their Medicaid coverage.
II. TOBACCO LITIGATION
A. Early Lawsuits
Prior to the 1950s, lawsuits against tobacco companies were
based on contaminants within tobacco not intentionally placed there
by the manufacturers, like a "decomposed human toe"23 or "mutilated
fragments of a dead mouse."2 4 These plaintiffs were, with a few
exceptions, successful. 25 But things changed during the first half of the
twentieth century. Smoking rates increased drastically-from 2.5
billion cigarettes consumed in 1900 to 369.8 billion in 1950.26 As more
23. Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365, 365 (Miss. 1918).
24. Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 241 N.Y.S. 233, 235 (N.Y. App. Term 1930).
25. See, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 54 S.W.2d 612, 612 (Ky. 1932) (holding
manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from wooly worm in chewing tobacco); Weiner v. D.A.
Schulte, Inc., 176 N.E. 114, 116 (Mass. 1931) (holding manufacturer liable for injuries resulting
from nail in chewing tobacco); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loftin, 99 So. 13, 13 (Miss. 1924)
(holding manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from partially decomposed snake in chewing
tobacco); Corum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 171 S.E. 78, 81 (N.C. 1933) (holding manufacturer
liable for injuries resulting from fishhook in chewing tobacco); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v.
Wallace, 69 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (holding manufacturer liable for injuries
resulting from metal particles in chewing tobacco). But see Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
296 N.Y.S. 922, 923 (N.Y. App. Term 1937) (per curiam) (excluding cigarettes from the category
of "dangerous articles" and not holding manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from piece of
razor blade in tobacco); Delk v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 186 S.E. 383, 386, 388 (S.C. 1936)
(rejecting res ipsa loquitur and finding insufficient proof of negligence when chewing tobacco
contained a tack); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 178 S.W. 1009, 1010-11 (Tenn. 1915)
(excluding tobacco from the category of "foodstuffs" and not holding manufacturer liable for
injuries resulting from insect in chewing tobacco).
26. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND STATISTICS UNIT, AM. LUNG ASS'N, TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE 16 tbl.2
(2008), http://www.notontobacco.com/media/files/TRENDTOBACCO_JULY_08-1.pdf
1086 [Vol. 63:4:1081
BIG TOBACCO, SMOKERS, AND MEDICAID
and more Americans smoked, more and more Americans developed
lung cancer. 27 Between 1938 and 1948, for example, lung-cancer rates
grew five times faster than any other form of cancer. 28 Influential
medical journals, including the Journal of the American Medical
Association and the British Medical Journal, published
epidemiological studies concluding that the increased smoking rates
had caused the increased lung-cancer rates. 29 Popular periodicals like
Reader's Digest disseminated the findings to the public through stories
with frightening titles, such as "Cancer by the Carton."30
America's "age of innocence" with tobacco had ended, and the
first wave of litigation against Big Tobacco for the adverse health
effects of its product was about to begin.31
1. The First Wave
The first wave lasted from the mid-1950s until the late 1960s. 3 2
The most successful plaintiff during this time was the surviving
spouse of a thirty-year smoker who died from lung cancer. In Green v.
American Tobacco Company, the plaintiff-widow alleged that the
messages communicated in cigarette advertisements breached express
[hereinafter TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE] (estimating total consumption of cigarettes in 2007 as 360
billion). During the 1940s, for example, Americans smoked "with growing abandon" and
whatever health issues were associated with smoking were viewed as trifling. RICHARD KLUGER,
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE
UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 132 (1997); see also id. (noting that, in 1949, surveys
indicated that more than half of all men and one-third of all women in the United States
smoked); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 855 (1992) (remarking that, during the 1950s, "[iut seems no exaggeration to say that
Americans loved the cigarette almost as much as the automobile').
27. See Colin Talley, Howard I. Kushner & Claire E. Sterk, Lung Cancer, Chronic Disease
Epidemiology, and Medicine, 1948-1964, 59 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sol. 329, 335 (2004) (noting
that, in the 1930s, reports about "alarming increases in lung cancer rates" began to emerge).
28. KLUGER, supra note 26, at 133.
29. Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J.
739 (1950); E. Cuyler Hammond & Daniel Horn, The Relationship Between Human Smoking
Habits and Death Rates: A Follow-Up Study of 187,766 Men, 155 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1316 (1954);
Morton L. Levin, Hyman Goldstein & Paul R. Gerhardt, Cancer and Tobacco Smoking: A
Preliminary Report, 143 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 336 (1950); Ernest L. Wynder & Evarts A. Graham,
Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor in Bronchiogenic Cancer: A Study of Six Hundred
and Eighty-Four Proved Cases, 143 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 329 (1950).
30. Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIG., Dec. 1952, at 7. Thus began the "cancer
scare" of the 1950s, a fearful time in American history, in general. MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN
SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS 27 (2002); see also EUGENIA
KALEDIN, DAILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1959: SHIFTING WORLDS 76 (2000) (describing
the late forties and early fifties-the McCarthy Era-as "a period of turmoil and fear as great as
any in American history").
31. KLUGER, supra note 26, at 133.
32. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 27.
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and implied warranties-a legal theory that proved popular, but
ultimately unsuccessful, during the first wave.33 The jury returned a
verdict for the manufacturer, 34 which the appeals court upheld,
finding that the proper benchmark for measuring the wholesomeness
of cigarettes was the standard set by other cigarettes. 35 The decedent
had consumed cigarettes that were "exactly like all others of the
particular brand and virtually the same as all other brands on the
market."36 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provided further
support: "Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because
the effects of smoking may be harmful."37
Green was only one of between 100 and 150 lawsuits filed
against tobacco companies during the first wave. 38 The relative
"success" of the Green plaintiff was making it to trial.39 By that
benchmark, the plaintiff in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Company was also successful. 4 0 Yet, in Pritchard, the tobacco company
33. 304 F.2d 70, 71 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified on rehearing, 154 So.2d 169 (Fla.
1963), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 391
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970). In both express and implied warranty claims, the plaintiff alleged that the
manufacturer provided a warranty that its cigarettes would not cause cancer or otherwise be
harmful to health. Id. at 73. In express warranty claims, the plaintiffs often relied on cigarette
advertisements touting the health benefits of smoking. For example, an advertisement for
Chesterfield brand cigarettes featured celebrity Arthur Godfrey, who seemed to be relaying
scientific news: "Nose, throat, and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking
Chesterfield. This is the first such report ever published about any cigarette. A responsible
consulting organization has reported the results of a continuing study by a competent medical
specialist and his staff on the effects of smoking Chesterfield cigarettes." Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1961). Later in the same advertisement, Godfrey
says: "That they mean what they say-that specialists] said it, Liggett and Myers have
substantiated it. Remember that when you're wondering about cigarettes. Smoke Chesterfields-
they're good. Thank you." Id. On the role of cigarette advertisements in the 1950s, see JOHN C.
BURNHAM, BAD HABITS: DRINKING, SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS, GAMBLING, SEXUAL MISBEHAVIOR,
AND SWEARING IN AMERICAN HISTORY 102-06 (1993).
34. Green, 391 F.2d at 99.
35. Green, 409 F.2d at 1166 (en banc rehearing adopting the reasoning of Judge Simpson's
dissent in the previous hearing).
36. Green, 391 F.2d at 110 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)); cf. Pritchard, 295
F.2d at 302 (Goodrich, J., concurring) (stating that one who damages his liver by drinking alcohol
has no claim unless the alcohol is adulterated or the distributor gave assurances that the alcohol
would not harm the consumer).
38. Rabin, supra note 26, at 857.
39. Id. at 859 (discussing the tobacco companies' litigation strategies based on overpowering
the plaintiffs and remarking that "[ilt should not be surprising, then, that only a handful of the
first wave cases actually came to trial").
40. 295 F.2d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 1961), 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966), amended, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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won at the trial level not once, but twice.41 After the second motion for
a new trial, which would have been the plaintiffs third trial, the
lawsuit was dropped. 42
Other claims were dismissed due to what appears to be the
incompetence of counsel. In Padovoni v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Company, for example, the plaintiffs lawyer refused to attend pretrial
hearings, with excuses including being engaged in another trial and
leaving the city for the holidays.43 The plaintiff eventually stopped
pursing the claim.44 Outside of their legal costs, Big Tobacco never
paid a penny; they had no unfavorable jury verdicts or reported
settlements throughout the entire first wave. 45
2. The Second Wave
After quiet on the litigation front during the 1970s, the second
wave hit in the mid-1980s and continued through the early 1990s, 4 6
during which plaintiffs brought an estimated 175 to 200 cases against
Big Tobacco. 47 By this point in American history, the antismoking
movement was strong,48 smoking was stigmatized,49 more people
41. After the first jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the tobacco company successfully
moved for a new trial. See Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 481 (describing the procedural posture of the
case).
42. Donald W. Garner reports that the plaintiff did not pursue the claim because of the
belief that "the problems of proof were 'insurmountable.' " Cigarette Dependency and Civil
Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1980). This explanation is at odds
with the actual rulings of the appeals court. On the first appeal, the Circuit Court found that
"the plaintiffs evidence ... definitely presents a jury question." Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 295. On
the second appeal, the Circuit Court held that the plaintiff was not required to prove that he
actually relied on the cigarette advertisements; rather, the plaintiff was required to prove only
that the advertisements were "such as would naturally tend 'to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods.' " Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 484. Moreover, the Circuit Court held that the defendant had
failed to prove that the plaintiff, "a cabinetmaker with no scientific background," knew about the
risks of smoking, thus eliminating the tobacco company's assumption-of-risk defense. Id. at 486.
43. 27 F.R.D. 37, 37-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
44. Rabin, supra note 26, at 860. For another instance of apparent attorney incompetence,
see Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 350 F. Supp. 341, 347 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (failing to reserve claim
with tobacco company after settling suit against city).
45. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 27.
46. Id.
47. Rabin, supra note 26, at 867 n.88 (basing the estimate on interviews with attorneys
involved in the litigation).
48. In 1989, the Assistant Secretary for Health and the Director of the Centers for Disease
Control could say: "The last 25 years have witnessed phenomenal changes in the way Americans
think about tobacco use. More people now than ever before consider smoking to be outside the
social norm." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, DHHS PUB. No.
(CDC) 89-8411, at ii (1989) [hereinafter 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS], available at http://profiles.nlm.
nih.gov/NN/B/B/X/S/.
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believed that smoking caused cancer,50 and concern over the health
effects of smoking permeated all levels of the federal government.51
The number of deaths due directly to smoking was shocking: in 1985,
for example, doctors attributed more than 314,000 U.S. deaths to
smoking.52 If juries were sympathetic to smokers' claims against Big
Tobacco, the industry's very existence would be in danger.53
To Big Tobacco, the second wave of litigation amounted to a
declaration of war, and the companies responded in kind.54 They
consistently employed the infamous "scorched-earth" defense:55 they
resisted discovery, obtained confidentiality orders on any discovery
produced, took lengthy depositions, appealed every adverse decision,
and acquired "every scrap of paper ever generated about a plaintiff,
from cradle to grave."5 6 Teams of lawyers from the nation's most
prestigious law firms handed down orders to local-firm lawyers,
providing a friendly face to small-town juries.57 Representing the
plaintiffs, by contrast, were "lone wolves" relying on contingent fees
for survival.58 Paraphrasing General Patton, an attorney for R.J.
49. See id. at iv (noting that, in 1989, smoking was "shunned"); see also Patrick W.
Corrigan, Marlboro Man and the Stigma of Smoking, in SMOKE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 344, 347-48
(Sander L. Gilman & Xun Zhou eds., 2004) (applying four criteria of stigmatization to smoking
and concluding that the activity, not the group who engages in the activity, are stigmatized);
Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 92 (1986)
("Cigarette smoking is now considered by many people to border on asocial behavior."); Rabin,
supra note 26, at 864 ("Smoking ... was now regarded with disdain by many - as an unhealthy
sign of weak character.").
50. See 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 48, at 188 (noting that, in 1954, 41 percent of
adults believed that smoking causes cancer, and in 1985, 1986, and 1987, between 87 and 95
percent of adults believed that smoking causes cancer).
51. See John K. Iglehart, The Campaign Against Smoking Gains Momentum, 314 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1059 (1986) (discussing the federal government's actions against smoking).
52. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends State-Specific Estimates of
Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost - United States, 1985, 37
MORTALITY MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. 689, 689 (1988), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/00001302.htm.
53. See Rabin, supra note 26, at 858 (pointing out that the tobacco companies were aware of
the published statistics on the number of deaths per year attributable to smoking, and that "[t]he
industry saw its very existence threatened and responded in an uncompromising fashion"). Big
Tobacco saw a recent example in the asbestos industry that made the possibility of bankruptcy
even less abstract: Johns-Manville Corp. declared bankruptcy in 1982. Id. at 868.
54. See Mark Hansen, Capitol Offenses, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 50 (noting Big Tobacco's
"hardball litigation tactics').
55. See Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Conduct in the "Tobacco Wars," 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 435,
435 (2001) ("Nor is there any doubt that the companies and their lawyers have pursued scorched-
earth litigation tactics.").
56. William E. Townsley & Dale K. Hanks, The Trial Court's Responsibility to Make
Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989).
57. Id. at 278.
58. Rabin, supra note 26, at 858.
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Reynolds described the company's hard-hitting litigation strategy:
"[T]he way we won these cases was not by spending all of Reynolds'
money, but by making (the enemy) spend all [of] his."59 The plaintiffs
were simply outmatched.60
One plaintiff came close to besting Big Tobacco, though, in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 6 1 The plaintiff in Cipollone, a widower
whose spouse had died from lung cancer, claimed breach of express
warranty and strict liability for failure to warn of the adverse health
effects of smoking.62 On the failure-to-warn claim, the jury found that
although the tobacco company had, in fact, failed to warn the decedent
about the adverse health effects of smoking, the decedent had
"voluntarily and unreasonably" assumed the risk by smoking, thereby
precluding any recovery.63 For the breach-of-warranty claim, the
plaintiff had relied on a cigarette advertisement in Life magazine that
asserted "no adverse effects."64 The jury found that Liggett Group had
breached this warranty when its cigarettes caused the decedent's lung
cancer, and-for the first time in the history of litigation over the
adverse health effects of tobacco-awarded the plaintiff damages of
$400,000.65 But the plaintiffs success was short-lived. On appeal, the
59. Myron Levin, Tobacco Industry Unharmed by Landmark Defeat in Smoker Death Case,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989, at A41.
60. See DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 27 (noting the tobacco industry's repeated successes in
court); Rabin, supra note 26, at 860 (noting the success of tort litigation for tobacco companies).
But see VIscUSI, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that, although "some plaintiffs attribute this success
to 'scorched earth litigation tactics,' the basic fact is that when cases reached the jury, the jurors
consistently concluded that the risks of cigarettes were well known and voluntarily incurred").
61. 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part,
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
62. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210.
63. Id. The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act became effective in 1966, which
required tobacco companies to place warnings on packages of cigarettes. 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1331-33
(West 2010). The jury's finding was, therefore, restricted to Liggett's failure to warn before 1966.
Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 210. Further, in a pre-trial ruling, the Third Circuit held that the
Labeling Act "preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking and health that
challenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's
actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes." Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's rationale behind finding preemption, see Rabin, supra note 26, at 869.
64. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at 214 n.8.
65. Id. at 210; see also Laurie P. Cohen & Alix M. Freedman, Cracks Seen in Tobacco's
Liability Dam, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1988 (discussing the verdict and predicting more lawsuits
as a result); Kurt Eichenwald, Setback to Tobacco Industry Is Termed Slim by Analysts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1988, at B4 (discussing the implications of the verdict); Alix M. Freedman,
Timothy K. Smith & John Helyar, Liggett Ordered to Pay $400,000 in Damages for Smoker's
Death, Jury's Ruling on Liability is First Against Industry, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1988
(discussing the implications of the verdict).
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federal circuit court vacated the award on the basis of faulty jury
instructions. 66
Assumption of risk was a constant refrain in the second wave,
as demonstrated in Horton v. American Tobacco Company.67 The
original plaintiff in Horton had smoked cigarettes for over thirty
years, developed emphysema and lung cancer, and died eight months
after suing the American Tobacco Company for breach of warranty.68
After an initial mistrial,69 the jury found the tobacco company liable
but awarded no damages. 70 When the plaintiff was initially deposed,
he had admitted that "[h]e had been aware, over the years, of
purported links between smoking and disease," even the link between
smoking and cancer.71 Indeed, he himself had referred to cigarettes as
"cancer sticks."72 One of the jurors on the case later reported: "I think
that we probably all felt that [smoking] caused him to be sick, but he
was an adult, he knew what he was doing, there was information at
that time."73 Big Tobacco's defenses-assumption of risk, in
particular-seemed impenetrable. 74 But the litigation landscape would
change once again for Big Tobacco.
B. The Third Wave: Medicaid Suits by the States
1. An Epiphany in Mississippi
Mississippi resident Jackie Thompson had smoked cigarettes
for decades and was lying in a hospital bed suffering from heart
66. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 569. Specifically, the jury should have been instructed that, to
prevail on the breach of warranty claim, the plaintiff was required to prove that Cipollone "had
read, seen, or heard the advertisements at issue." Id.
67. 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
68. OREY, supra note 2, at 30, 32, 63.
69. Id. at 131. For media coverage, see Patricia Bellew Gray, Mistrial in American Brands
Unit Suit Seen as Setback for Anti-Tobacco Forces, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1988.
70. Horton v. Am. Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Miss. 1995).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. OREY, supra note 2, at 143. The jury was instructed on assumption of risk as follows:
"[Ilf [the jury] found that Horton appreciated the risk of using cigarettes and voluntarily used
cigarettes in violation of that risk, then the jury should find for the defendant American Tobacco
Company." Horton, 667 So. 2d at 1292.
74. For other cases filed during the second wave, see, for example, Marsee v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., 639 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986), affd in part, 866 F.2d 319, 321 (10th Cir. 1989)
(upholding defense verdict in strict liability suit on behalf of 19-year-old who used smokeless
tobacco and died from tongue cancer); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding directed verdict for defense
in strict liability suit brought by smoker, and holding that cigarettes are not unreasonably
dangerous).
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disease, awaiting a heart-lung transplant.75 It was March 1993, and
Mississippi attorney Mike Lewis was visiting Thompson at Baptist
Memorial Hospital in Memphis.76 Lewis reported the experience of
seeing Thompson, ravaged by the toll that cigarette smoking had
taken on her body: "The emotion that I was really feeling was a desire
for revenge, for vindication. . . I wanted to destroy the tobacco
industry, to put them out of business."77
While driving back to his home in Clarksdale, Mississippi,
Lewis was struck by the possibility of a lawsuit against Big Tobacco
based on the financial harm that its products caused state taxpayers;
that is, a lawsuit against Big Tobacco filed not by an individual
smoker, but by the state qua state.78 The states, Lewis thought, were
financially harmed by the tobacco industry's products when they
expended money on tobacco-related disease through Medicaid.79 Lewis
contacted his friend and former law-school classmate, Michael Moore,
who also served as Mississippi's attorney general.80 Just two months
later, on May 23, 1994, Mississippi became the first state to sue the
tobacco industry on behalf of its citizens to recover funds expended
through its Medicaid program on tobacco-related diseases.81 The
complaint contained a host of equitable theories of recovery, including
unjust enrichment, indemnity, public nuisance, and a request for
injunctive relief.82
a. Unjust Enrichment
In its complaint, the state asserted that Big Tobacco had a duty
to cover the costs of treating tobacco-related disease-that is, to "stand
financial[ly] responsible for the harm done by their cigarettes."83 Many
of those harmed by cigarettes, the complaint noted, "are poor,
undereducated, and unable to provide for their own medical care."84
75. OREY, supra note 2, at 223.
76. Id.




81. Moore ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Jackson County May 23,
1994), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites/all/files/ucsfLassets/ms_complaint.pdf.
82. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, 11 78-83, 84-88, 89-91, 92-98; see also Michael C.
Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, A New Attack on Smoking Using an Old-Time Remedy, 111 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 192, 198 (1996) (claiming that the State is entitled to restitution/unjust
enrichment, indemnity, public nuisance relief, and injunctive relief).




For these smokers, the state stepped in and fulfilled Big Tobacco's
obligation through its Medicaid program, which is partially funded by
the state's taxpayers.85 Taxpayers had "thus unofficially expended
hundreds of millions of dollars in caring for their fellow citizens who
have" tobacco-related diseases, while "the tobacco cartel continues to
reap billions of dollars in profits."86 Therefore, the tobacco industry
was unjustly enriched by the amount the companies should have paid
to cover the harm caused by cigarettes-namely, the same amount
that the state had paid to cover the healthcare costs of tobacco-related
diseases for Medicaid-covered smokers. In addition, the State sought
damages "for the sums of money to be paid by the State in the future
on account of the defendants' wrongful conduct."87
b. Indemnity
Similarly, the state's indemnity theory asserted that the
tobacco industry had a duty to cover the healthcare costs of tobacco-
related disease.88 The state, however, "was legally obligated to pay"
these costs under its Medicaid program. 89 Moore, writing separately
from the original complaint, said that the state "is an innocent third
party to the dealing between the indigent sick smoker and the
industry" and therefore "should be indemnified for its losses by
shifting those costs to the industry."90 For relief, the State sought
damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, expert fees, and
punitive damages "in such amount as will sufficiently punish the
defendants for their conduct."9'
c. Public Nuisance
Mississippi's complaint also contained several allegations about
Big Tobacco's wrongful conduct. The state alleged that, acting through
85. States receive reimbursement from the United States Department of Health and
Human Services for the costs of administering their Medicaid programs. Each state's respective
per capita income determines the level of reimbursement. Generally, reimbursement ranges from
55 percent for states with average to above average per capita incomes, to 83 percent for states
with the lowest per capita incomes. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b (West 2010).
86. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, 79-80. Moreover, the State contended that the reason
the tobacco industry was so profitable was because the industry had "spent billions in slick,
sophisticated marketing tactics designed to make smoking appear more glamorous to our
youngsters." Id. 1 81.
87. Id. I 83(b) (emphasis added).
88. Id. 1 84-88.
89. Id. 1 86.
90. Moore & Mikhail, supra note 82, at 198.
91. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, T 88.
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the Council for Tobacco Research, the industry had intentionally
deceived the citizens of Mississippi about the health risks of smoking
by questioning the scientific evidence linking smoking and lung
cancer.92 The goal of this "promotional, public relations, and lobbying
blitz," the state argued, was to increase the number of people addicted
to nicotine and to decrease the number of people who would quit
smoking.93 By engaging in such wrongful conduct, the manufacturers
of tobacco became a public nuisance that caused the state to spend
"millions of dollars in support of the public health and welfare"
through its Medicaid program. 94
d. Injunctive Relief
The state's request for injunctive relief centered on Big
Tobacco's marketing aimed at children.95 Marketing cigarettes to
children created "successive generations of addictive customers" who
ultimately would develop tobacco-related diseases. 96 To stop the
recruitment of minors into the ranks of addicted smokers, the state
sought to enjoin the industry not only from promoting cigarettes to
children, but also from assisting-"aiding, abetting or encouraging," in
the words of the complaint-in the distribution of cigarettes to
children.97 Failing to impose such an injunction, the state asserted,
would lead to irreparable harm to minors, who would be doomed to a
life of addiction and the attendant consequences for their health. 98
2. The Master Settlement Agreement
Soon after filing the Mississippi complaint, Moore recruited
other states to join the effort. Moore spoke at antitobacco conferences
and, with the help of his friend Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, the hugely
successful plaintiffs' class-action attorney, "flew around the country in
Scruggs's Lear jet, touching down in state capitals to plead their
cause."99 Using the Mississippi complaint as a model, Minnesota and
West Virginia filed suits in 1994; Florida and Massachusetts followed
92. Id. f 42-43.
93. Id. 59.
94. Id. T 90.
95. Id. IT 93-95.
96. Id. 1 93. A Philip Morris executive stated that "[tloday's teenager is tomorrow's
potential regular smoker." YOUNG SMOKERS, supra note 6, at 6.
97. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, $ 95.
98. Id. T 96.
99. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 79; see also Vandall, supra note 9, at 480 (noting that
Michael Moore spoke at antitobacco conferences).
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in 1995.100 Thirteen more states filed in 1996,101 twenty-two in 1997,
and two more in 1998.102 Moore had attained one of his original goals:
to "build an army the size the tobacco industry had."103
Moore's army had considerable resources. Each of the forty-two
attorneys general had substantial legal departments devoted solely to
the Medicaid suits. 1 04 Additionally, the states hired around one
hundred private law firms to assist with the effort. 105 And unlike
individual plaintiffs' lawyers, the states had "moral authority"106-the
imprimatur of the government gave the lawsuits a new form of
legitimacy. Big Tobacco now faced a unique foe, and traditional
defenses developed in response to individual smokers' claims were
unavailable. Assumption of risk, for example, would be at least "one
step removed" from the role it played in individual actions, if not
entirely unavailable: the states did not assume the risks of smoking,
unlike individual smokers, who did so either knowingly or
100. Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites/all/files/ucsfassets/mn-complaint.pdf- State v. Am. Tobacco
Co., No. 95-1466AO (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County Feb. 21, 1995), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites/alllfiles/ucsf-assets/lflorida.pdf; Massachusetts v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378 (Mass. Super. Ct. Middlesex County Dec. 19, 1995), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf-assets/8macomplaint.pdf- McGraw ex rel. State v.
Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1707 (W.V. Cir. Ct. Kanawha County Sept. 20, 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites/alllfiles/ucsf-assets/wvcomplaint.pdf.
101. The thirteen states that filed in 1996 were Utah, Texas, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Washington. For
both a chart summarizing the dates for all fifty states, and the complaints as filed, see Tobacco
Control Archives, UCSF Library, State Lawsuits, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edul
tobaccollitigation/states.
102. The twenty-two states that filed in 1997 were Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. The two that filed in 1998 were Nebraska and South Dakota. For the actual
complaints, see Tobacco Control Archives, UCSF Library, State Lawsuits, available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobaccollitigation/states (select name of state and follow complaint
hyperlink).
103. The Year in Review, supra note 11, at B7.
104. Eight states never filed lawsuits against Big Tobacco, although they were signatories to
the MSA: Alabama, Delaware, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Wyoming, Kentucky,
and Virginia.
105. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 183. The decision to contract with private tort lawyers was,
at least in Mississippi, political as well: "When [Moore] filed his lawsuit, a key state legislative
chairman told Mr. Moore he would get 'not one penny' of taxpayer money to sue the tobacco
industry. So he pursued the case using well-financed tort lawyers . The Year in Review,
supra note 11, at B7.
106. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits after Tobacco: Is the
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 685, 689
(2000).
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otherwise. 07 Finally, given the size, resources, and collective
determination of the attorneys general, Big Tobacco's scorched-earth
litigation strategy was effectively nullified.108
The states' legal theory was unique, although not original to
Mike Lewis. In 1977, Donald Garner published Cigarettes and Welfare
Reform, where he argued:
[A] substantial and growing part of the economic costs wrought by smoking are borne by
nonsmokers.... [When an indigent smoker develops a cigarette-related illness, his
medical bills are often paid by the public through tax-supported hospitals and social
health care programs. The nonsmoking taxpayer is sick much less frequently;
consequently . . . the nonsmoker is contributing proportionately more to the various
health funds than he will receive in return.... Thus, the nonsmoking public indirectly
subsidizes and promotes the consumption of tobacco products.1
0 9
This "irrationality," as Garner called it, could be remedied by
terminating the subsidies provided by taxpayers. 10 The healthcare
costs of smoking could be transferred from the taxpayers to the
tobacco companies. Beyond remedying this irrationality, transferring
the costs to manufacturers would provide incentives to produce safer
cigarettes."' One mechanism for this transfer of costs would be "civil
adjudication," which Garner described as "a system of civil liability
that would make the manufacturer whose cigarettes caused an illness
liable to repay the appropriate government agency."112 Seventeen
107. Id. Cupp bases this one-step-removed point on the notion that the states were suing on
behalf of smokers, id. at 696, which is false. The states were suing on behalf of taxpayers who
bore the financial burden of Medicaid-covered smokers' health care. As part of the unjust
enrichment count, the Mississippi complaint refers to the burden on "Mississippi taxpayers" who
have "expended hundreds of millions of dollars in caring for their fellow citizens." Moore ex rel.
State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429, 1 79 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County May 23, 1994),
available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf assets/mscomplaint.pdf. Moreover,
the complaint explicitly contended that Big Tobacco was "unjustly enriched to the extent that
Mississippi's taxpayers have had to pay these costs." Id. 82.
108. See Cupp, supra note 106, at 689 (stating that "[one of the keys to the states' success
was combining their efforts," and that even a single state has "greater litigation resources and
moral authority than is typically present in mass tort actions initiated by private attorneys"); see
also Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco Litigation, 26 WM. &
MARY ENV'L L. & POL'Y REV. 123, 134 (2001) ("[T]he state governments were not outsized by the
tobacco defendants in terms of resources or power, especially when those state attorneys general
joined forces and pursued their claims collectively.").
109. 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 272 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 275.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 277. Big Tobacco had also considered a similar argument one year after the
publication of Garner's article. In 1978, Philip Morris explicitly discussed the argument that
"cigarettes cause disease; disease requires treatment; major health costs are borne by the
government; taxpayers pay in the end." Memorandum from R.B. Seligman, Vice President of
Research & Dev., Philip Morris, to J.C. Bowling, Senior Vice President, Philip Morris (Nov. 20,
1978), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2015015777.html.
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years after writing his article, Garner's idea came to fruition in the
states' recoupment suits.
At first, it seemed as if Big Tobacco would not back down. "We
don't intend to lose," R.J. Reynolds's general counsel remarked in
January 1997.113 "[W e're not in the business of settling cases that
have no merit in law or fact."114
Six months later, as the Mississippi case was set for trial,115 the
industry settled with the state for $3.6 billion. 116 One month later, it
settled with Florida for $11.3 billion,117 and during the first half of
1998, Big Tobacco settled with Texas for $15.3 billions18 and
Minnesota for $6.6 billion.119 On November 16, 1998, the tobacco
industry and the remaining forty-six states, the District of Columbia,
and five U.S. territories executed the Master Settlement
Agreement.120 The original signatories on the industry side were
Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Lorillard,
and Liggett Group.121
113. Hansen, supra note 54, at 53 (quoting Daniel W. Donahue, deputy general counsel for
R.J. Reynolds Co.).
114. Id. This is inconsistent with R.B. Seligman's assessment, made in 1978, of a similar
argument as a "potent weapon|]." Memorandum from R.B. Seligman, Vice President of Research
& Dev., Philip Morris, to J.C. Bowling, Philip Morris (Nov. 20, 1978), available at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2015015777.html.
115. See VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 37 (noting that the Mississippi settlement was the first
after "the June 1997 Proposed Resolution effort began to dim").
116. Id.; Memorandum of Understanding, In re Moore ex rel. State Tobacco Litig., No. 94-
1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County July 2, 1997), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edulsites
/alllfiles/ucsfassets/ms-settlement.pdf; see also John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, Tobacco Firms,
Mississippi Settle, WASH. POST, July 4, 1997, at Al (reporting that the settlement was for $3.4
billion).
117. VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 37; Settlement Agreement, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-
1466 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County Aug. 25, 1997), available at http://www.library.
ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf_assets/flsettle.pdf; John Schwartz, Cigarette Makers Settle Florida
Suit for $11.3 Billion, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al.
118. VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 37; Comprehensive Settlement Agreement and Release, Texas
v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5-96CV-91 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 1998), available at http://www.library.ucsf.
edu/sites/all/files/ucsf assets/txsettlement.pdf; Saundra Torry & Ceci Connolly, Tobacco Firms
Set to Pay Texas $14.5 Billion, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al.
119. Settlement Agreement and Stipulation for Entry of Consent Judgment, State v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. D. Ct. May 8, 1998), available at http://www.library.
ucsf.edulsites/all/files/ucsfassets/mnsettlement.pdf.
120. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19; John Schwartz, Tobacco Settles
Minnesota Suit, WASH. POST, May 9, 1998, at Al. For a summary of the MSA, see Up in Smoke:
Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Tobacco, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 167 app. III (1998).
121. The negotiations between the attorneys general and the states were secret, so any
explanation of why Big Tobacco settled is, to some degree, speculative. On the negotiations, see
Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
187, 195 (2000); Panel Discussion, The Tobacco Settlement: Practical Implications and the Future
of the Tort Law, 67 MiSS. L.J. 847 (1998).
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a. Economic Terms
Most reports value the settlement at $206 billion through
2023,122 although the actual value through 2023 is slightly more than
$211 billion.123 Table I summarizes the annual payments:
TABLE I. ANNUAL PAYMENTS UNDER MSA124











The amount for which a particular company is responsible in a
given year depends on that company's market share in the preceding
year, measured by the number of cigarettes sold.125 For example, if a
company's market share in 2007 was 50 percent, then that company
will be responsible for $4.5 billion in 2008.
The MSA also included payment provisions earmarked for
enforcement of the settlement.126 The tobacco companies were
122. VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 41.
123. See id. at 44 ("These amounts are $12.7 billion for the initial payments, $190 billion for
the annual payments, and $9 billion for the additional payments, for a total amount of $211
billion."). Commenting elsewhere on the MSA, Viscusi says: "The settlement of the Attorney
Generals' suits against the cigarette industry for $206 billion was a landmark outcome. By any
standard, the financial stakes were enormous, dwarfing even the largest tort liability judgments
and punitive damages awards. Moreover, what was especially noteworthy was that the party
paying for the costs was the cigarette industry, which to date had been almost unscathed after
decades of litigation involving the hazards of smoking." Viscusi, supra note 21, at 523. It is
important to note that the $206 billion in the MSA is in addition to the $36.8 billion to be paid to
Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota, which settled independently. See VISCUSI, supra
note 2, at 38 ("The $36.8 billion in settlements for the four separate state settlements are not
included in the overall announced price tag of $206 billion . . .. Thus, the total settlement value
with all fifty states is $243 billion.").
124. VIscUSI, supra note 2, at 43 tbl.1.
125. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 9 (defining "Market Share"), 45;
VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 41.
126. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at Exhibit J; VIScUSI, supra note 2, at 42.
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required to pay an initial amount of $50 million in 1999 and thereafter
$150,000 annually over 10 years, or $1.5 million. 127
In addition to the nonearmarked annual payments in Table I
and the funding for enforcing the settlement, Big Tobacco must make
special payments to establish a foundation.128 The dual purposes of the
foundation are to reduce youth smoking and support educational
programs designed to prevent tobacco-related diseases.129 The "Base
Foundation Payments" are $25 million annually from 1999 until 2008,
for a total of $250 million.130 In addition to the base payments, the
tobacco companies paid $250 million in 1999 and $300 million
annually from 2000 until 2003, for a total of $1.45 billion.131 All told,
the payments-specifically designated to educate the public about
tobacco-related disease and prevent youth-smoking-constitute less
than 1 percent of the total settlement value.132
b. Regulatory Terms
The MSA contains regulatory measures aimed at cigarette
advertising. Big Tobacco cannot "target Youth within any Settling
State in the advertising, promotion, or marketing of Tobacco Products,
or take any action the primary purpose of which is to initiate,
maintain or increase the incidence of Youth smoking within any
Settling State." 33 Cartoons used in advertising, packaging, or labeling
are banned,134 although R.J. Reynolds voluntarily withdrew "Joe
Camel" from the market in 1997.135 Big Tobacco cannot advertise on
outdoor billboards; cannot advertise on signs and placards in arenas,
in shopping malls and arcades, or on transit systems; and cannot
institute any new outdoor advertising of any kind. 36 The only
exception is for adult-only facilities.137 The MSA also prohibits product
placements and limits Big Tobacco's lobbying activities. The
companies cannot sponsor sporting events, concerts, or any event
127. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 54; VIscusI, supra note 2, at 42.
128. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 41.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Id.
132. VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 42; see also id. (noting that "[tihese [educational] measures are
not the main point of the settlement, which is simply to transfer money to the states").
133. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 18-19. The MSA defines "Youth" as
any person or persons under 18 years of age." Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 19.
135. ViSCUSI, supra note 2, at 38.
136. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 22.
137. Id.
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where a significant number of children will be present. Finally, the
MSA dissolved the Center for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco
Institute.138
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MSA
On its face, the MSA appears to be a fair deal. An industry
with a history of deception that produces a product that kills hundreds
of thousands of Americans each year must pay for the economic harm
it inflicts on taxpayers who, through Medicaid, foot the bill that the
industry should be paying. But the law is concerned with the
substance of a matter, not how it appears.139 An examination of the
MSA's detailed provisions in light of the "time honored precept"140 that
substance should prevail over form reveals a violation of the Social
Security Act. Title XIX of the Act, which established the Medicaid
program, also governs the conditions under which a state may charge
a Medicaid recipient a premium or other fee for Medicaid coverage.
138. Id. at 32.
139. Courts have applied the substance-over-form doctrine in various legal contexts. See, e.g.,
Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 430 (2008) ("There is no reason to doubt that the
economic substance remains the right touchstone for characterizing funds received when a
shareholder diverts them before they can be recorded on the corporation's books."); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 n.21 (1984) (referring to the "broader
principle that substance, not form, should determine whether a separately incorporated entity is
capable of conspiring under § 1" of the Sherman Act); Diedrich v. C.I.R., 457 U.S. 191, 195 (1982)
(remarking that, when determining whether taxable income was received, "the substance, not
the form, of the agreed transaction controls"); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573
(1978) (referring to the "doctrine of substance over form" and noting that, in applying this
doctrine, "the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than to
the particular form the parties employed"); United States v. R.F. Ball Const. Co., 355 U.S. 587,
593 (1958) ("Substance, not form or labels, controls the nature and effect of legal instruments.");
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (finding that, although the business transaction
was designed as a corporate reorganization, it was a conveyance, and noting that, to hold
otherwise would "exalt artifice above reality"); Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97 (1st
Cir. 2008) (stating that, when distinguishing between a writ of coram nobis and a motion to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, "courts must be guided by the
precept that substance trumps form" (citation omitted)); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402
F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2005) (appealing to the principle that "substance trumps form" and stating
that "[p]ayments made on behalf of a debtor, whether made directly or indirectly . . . constitute
that particular debtor's disbursements"); United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 416 F.3d 609,
612 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that, when distinguishing between leases and secured credit in
the context of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, substance prevails over form); In re Charter
Comm'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 783 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Whether a court is presented with a case or
controversy is a question of substance, not form."); Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 847
(7th Cir. 1987) (when determining whether an entity, like a university, is an agent of the state,
courts "must look to substance rather than form"); Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Comm'r, 8
T.C.M. (CCH) 84, at *15 (1949) ("Taxation deals with realities not semblances; with substance
not form.").
140. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2007).
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In short, the argument presented in this Part is as follows.
First, under the MSA, Medicaid-covered smokers make de facto
payments to their states for their Medicaid coverage. Second, the
payments made by Medicaid-covered smokers violate the Act.
Therefore, the MSA violates the Act.
An analysis of Big Tobacco's actions following the MSA and the
details of the economic terms of the MSA leads to the first premise. An
analysis of the provisions of the Social Security Act that govern when
a state may charge a Medicaid recipient a premium or other fee leads
to the second premise.
A. The First Premise: De Facto Payments
1. Price Increases and Passing Costs
In response to the financial obligations incurred under the
MSA, Big Tobacco increased the price of cigarettes. In the three years
preceding the MSA, annual increases of the average price of a package
of cigarettes were small-5 cents from 1995 to 1996, and 10 cents from
1996 to 1997.141 Yet, the day after Big Tobacco signed the MSA,
industry leaders Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds raised the price of a
pack of cigarettes by 45 cents,142 the largest increase in the history of
Big Tobacco.143 Subsequent increases, likewise, were quite large.
Between 1998 and 2002, for example, the average price increased by
108 percent, relative to a 28 percent increase from 1995 to 1998.144
141. 42 THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO: HISTORICAL COMPILATION 144, 146, 148
(Orzechowski & Walker eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE TAX BURDEN]; cf. DERTHICK, supra note 30,
at 1 (stating the price of a pack of cigarettes in 1997 as $1.90). Figures from The Tax Burden
represent the weighted average of all brands of cigarettes, including generic brands, across the
United States, and exclude sales tax and, in eight states (Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri,
New York, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia), exclude taxes imposed by municipalities.
142. Sylvia Nasar, The Ifs and Buts of the Tobacco Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, §
4, at 1.
143. Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Announce Large Price Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at
A20 (quoting David Adelman, Morgan Stanley analyst).
144. Rahul Rajkumar, Cary P. Gross & Howard P. Forman, Is the Tobacco Settlement
Constitutional?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 748, 751 (2006). Media coverage of the increases was
extensive. See, e.g., Philip Morris is Raising Cigarette Prices by 3%, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2000, at
C3 (noting that, in 1999, Philip Morris raised prices to "help pay for rising legal settlement
costs"); see also Gordon Fairclough, Major Makers of Cigarettes Raise Prices, WALL ST. J., Aug.
31, 1999, at A3 (describing 18 cent per pack price increase as "the second largest cigarette price
increase in history'); Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris Boosts Prices of Cigarettes, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 2000, at B12 (noting 13 cent per pack price increase); Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris,
R.J. Reynolds Are Raising Cigarette Prices by Six Cents a Pack, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2000, at A4
(observing 6 cent per pack price increase); Philip Morris Raises Prices of Cigarettes 140 a Pack,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at C4 (noting 14 cent per pack price increase). The price increases led
to a class action brought on behalf of cigarette wholesalers, A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Phillip
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Table II contains the weighted average price per package of cigarettes,
which excludes state and federal taxes, from 1995 to 2007.

















The timing of the price increases, as well as the lack of any
other plausible explanation, 146 strongly suggests that tobacco
Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001), and a class-action lawsuit brought on behalf of
consumers, Sanders v. Lockyer, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (price-per-carton
was raised by $4.50 on the day the MSA was signed, and by $7.70 in 2001).
145. THE TAX BURDEN, supra note 141, at 144-68 tbl.13B. The weighted average price per
pack includes generic brand cigarettes.
146. Demand may have played a role, albeit a minor one, in the price increases. Generally,
cigarette consumption began declining in the early 1980s. TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE, supra note
26, at tbl.2. Between 1990 and 2002, however, smoking rates for 18- to 20-year-olds increased by
36 percent and smoking rates for 21- to 24-year-olds increased by 30 percent. Further, there was
only a marginal decrease in smoking rates for persons aged twenty-five and older during the
same period. Frank A. Sloan & Justin C. Trogdon, The Impact of the Master Settlement
Agreement on Cigarette Consumption, 23 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 843, 846 (2004). Sloan and
Trogdon estimate, based on counterfactuals, that the MSA reduced smoking rates for 18- to 20-
year-olds and those over 65 years old by 13 percent, and reduced smoking rates for 21- to 64-
year-olds by 5 percent. Id. at 852.
The inflation rate likewise fails to explain the increases: For the years surrounding the
execution of the MSA and the industry's largest cigarette-price increase, the inflation rates were:
1995, 2.8 percent; 1996, 3.0 percent; 1997, 2.3 percent; 1998 and MSA, 1.6 percent; 1999, 2.2
percent; 2000, 3.4 percent; 2001, 2.8 percent; 2002, 1.6 percent. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/cpil#tables.
Further, when the inflation rate dropped to 1.6 percent in 1998, it was the first time it had been
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companies transferred the costs of the MSA to smokers. For instance,
one might look to an increase in the farm value of tobacco to explain
the price increases. The farm value of tobacco is the average price that
cigarette manufacturers pay for tobacco. This variable accounts for
less than 1 percent of the overall increase in cigarette prices.147 In fact,
the farm value of tobacco decreased from 1998 to 1999, the same
period during which Big Tobacco made the most drastic increase on
cigarette prices.148 From 1999 to 2006, the farm value of tobacco
remained relatively stable. It then dropped to its lowest value in
thirty-seven years in 2007 at $520 million, the same year that marks
the highest price per pack of cigarettes in the history of tobacco in the
United States. 149 Thus, the farm value of tobacco cannot explain the
price increases. Nor, for that matter, can the cost of production, which
has remained stable at about $0.16 per pack.o50
2. MSA Provisions that Protect the OPMs
It comes as no surprise that Big Tobacco passed the costs of the
MSA to smokers; indeed, firms frequently pass costs to consumers.151
But the attorneys general who negotiated the MSA had even more
reason to expect price increases: the terms of the MSA practically
guaranteed such a result. Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown and
Williamson Tobacco, and Lorillard are all deemed "Original
Participating Manufacturers" ("OPMs") under the MSA.152 When the
MSA was executed, only these companies and Liggett Group were
signatories.153 An OPM's obligations under the MSA are tied to that
OPM's market share.154 Thus, the more cigarettes an OPM sells, the
that low since 1965, and it was only one of two times it had been below 2 percent during that
same period of time-in the other year, 1986, the rate was 1.9 percent. Id.
147. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 1.
148. See THE TAx BURDEN, supra note 141, at 2 (showing drastic increase in cigarette excise
taxes and slow decline in tobacco farm value).
149. Id. At the same time, the farm value was likely influenced by demand for cigarettes,
which had been in steady decline since the 1980s. See id. at 2-3 (showing both the decreasing
trend in farm value and the broader trend toward less consumption of cigarettes).
150. DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 1.
151. See, e.g., Louis Aguilar, Utility-Rate Avalanche Looms for Metro Area 38,000 Families
Seek Aid; Average Bill to Hit $170, DENVER POST, Nov. 28, 2003, at A-01 (discussing utility
companies passing the increased cost of natural gas on to consumers); Carin Rubenstein, Cost of
Living; As Gasoline Prices Rise, So Do Surcharges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at 14WC
(discussing small business passing increased gasoline surcharges to consumers).
152. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 10.
153. Id. at 147 (noting that all parties have agreed to the terms of the document).
154. Id. at 57.
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more the company must pay the states; by the same token, selling
fewer cigarettes leads to less money owed to the states. 155
This market-share provision created predictable incentives. If
an OPM decreased the price of cigarettes, more consumers would
purchase that company's cigarettes, thereby increasing its market
share. If an OPM's market share increased, the amount it would be
required to pay under the MSA would increase. And as an OPM's
obligations under the MSA increased, its profits would decrease.156
Conversely, an OPM could decrease its obligations under the MSA by
raising the price of cigarettes, thereby decreasing market share and
retaining greater profit. So, the OPMs collectively passed the costs of
the MSA to smokers by increasing prices without the risk of being
underpriced by another OPM.
Perhaps even more critically, the OPMs received protection
from new entrants into the cigarette market. The MSA deems new
entrants "Non-Participating Manufacturers" ("NPMs").15 7 An NPM, by
definition, was not an original party to the MSA. Unlike the OPMs,
NPMs have no financial obligations under the MSA. An NPM could
thus enter the cigarette market and price cigarettes well below the
average OPM's price without facing any consequences under the MSA.
As the NPM's market share increased due to its lower prices, its
profits would also increase. NPMs could thus dominate the cigarette
market, driving the OPMs out of business.
The Non-Participating Manufacture Adjustment ("NPM
Adjustment") of the MSA addresses this problem. The NPM
Adjustment provides that if the OPMs collectively lose more than 2
percent of the market share to an NPM, then the NPM Adjustment
trebles the decrease in the OPMs' collective obligations.158
155. Id.
156. THOMAS C. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS OF THE MULTISTATE
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 4 (2000).
157. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 58; see also Thomas C. O'Brien &
Robert A. Levy, A Tobacco Cartel is Born, Paid For by Smokers, WALL ST. J. May 1, 2000, at A35
(observing that Big Tobacco "managed to carve out a protected market for themselves - all at the
expense of smokers and the tobacco companies that didn't sign the [MSA]").
158. Id. at 59; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 156, at 4 (construing the NPM Adjustment of the
MSA as a provision that applies to the OPMs as a group). But see Freedom Holdings, Inc. v.
Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2004) (construing the NPM Adjustment of the MSA as a
provision that applies to individual OPMs). The MSA defines "Base Aggregate Participating
Manufacture Market Share" as the market share "of all present and former Tobacco Product
Manufacturers that were Participating Manufacturers during the entire calendar year
immediately preceding the year in which the payment in question is due minus [2 percent]."
Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 60. So, the NPM Adjustment applies not only to
OPMs, but also firms that were not originally signatories to the MSA, but successfully applied to
become parties to it.
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By itself, the NPM Adjustment would not deter new entrants
into the cigarette market; it only would decrease the OPMs'
obligations if NPMs enter the market. Yet the entrance of NPMs into
the market would cause the amount of money the OPMs pay the
states under the MSA to decrease significantly. This would financially
devastate the states, which now rely on MSA payments for
infrastructure, debt repayment, budget shortfalls, and a host of other
programs. 59 But the MSA includes a provision to protect the states
from the NPM Adjustment. The NPM Adjustment does not apply if
the state enacts a "Qualifying Statute" that imposes financial
penalties on new entrants. 160 For example, Tennessee's Qualifying
Statute, which is based on the model statute provided in the MSA and
is typical of others passed after the MSA's execution, covers "[any
tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within
the state of Tennessee."161 The statute forces all tobacco
manufacturers to choose between two options: either (1) participate in
the MSA and pay the states according to its market share, or (2) not
participate in the MSA, but pay into an escrow fund amounts
exceeding obligations under the MSA.162 The only other option, of
course, is to drop out of the cigarette business altogether.163
159. Frank A. Sloan et al., Determinants of States' Allocations of the Master Settlement
Agreement Payments, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 643, 653 (2005).
160. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 65.
161. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-31-103(a) (West 2008). Tennessee's Qualifying Statute is based
on the Model Statute provided in the Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at Exhibit T.
All settling states have Qualifying Statutes. John A. Tauras, Richard M. Peck & Frank J.
Chaloupka, The Role of Retail Prices and Promotions in Determining Cigarette Brand Market
Shares, 28 REV. INDUS. ORG. 253, 260 (2006); e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 94E, § 2 (West
2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 370A.010 - 370A.160 (West 2008).
162. TENN. CODE. ANN § 47-31-103(a)(1)-(2). If an NPM chooses the first option and decides
to participate in the MSA, then it only has payment obligations if its market share exceeds either
its 1998 market share or 125 percent of its 1997 market share, whichever is greater. Master
Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at 60. If obligations are triggered, then the manufacturer
must make annual payments in an amount computed similar to the OPMs' obligations. The
formula is at Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 20, at 60. If the base amount due from
OPMs for a given year is $9 billion, and the SPM's market share for that year increased by 3
percent from its 1998 market share or 125 percent of its 1997 market share, whichever is
greater, (i.e., the SPM had zero percent of the market pre-MSA), and the OPMs' market share in
the preceding year was 97 percent, then the SPM will make a payment of around $278 million
(increased market share divided by the market share of the OPMs in the preceding year,
multiplied by the base amount due from the OPMs).
If the NPM chooses the second option and refuses to participate in the MSA, then the NPM
must deposit, on an annual basis, $0.0188482 into an escrow account for each individual
cigarette sold. This works out to more than what the NPM would have paid, if the NPM decided
to participate in the MSA. O'BRIEN, supra note 156, at 24 n.20 (stating the amount paid into the
escrow account would be "approximately 150 percent" of the amount the firm would pay under
the MSA). But see Tauras et al., supra note 161, at 260 (stating the amount paid into the escrow
account would be "equivalent" to the amount paid under the MSA). At the same time, however,
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3. Passing Costs and De Facto Payments
How, though, does passing costs equal de facto payments? In
other words, how does (A) "Big Tobacco passed the costs of the MSA to
smokers" lead to (B) "Medicaid-covered smokers make de facto
payments to the states for their Medicaid"?
The following hypothetical frames the question more clearly.
Suppose a resident of Florida smokes Philip Morris cigarettes.
Suppose further that this smoker is covered by Florida's Medicaid
plan. After the MSA, this smoker saw the price of his cigarettes
increase to about $4.20 per pack. Proposition (A) states that the
smoker is bearing the cost of the MSA by paying more for cigarettes.
Proposition (B) states that the smoker is paying Florida for her
Medicaid coverage by paying more for cigarettes. On its face, (B)
makes an entirely different statement than (A).
First, the transition from (A) to (B) assumes that some smokers
receive Medicaid, which is true. In 2006, for example, 35 percent of
Medicaid recipients, or 16.8 million people, smoked.164 But the
the Tennessee statute, like others, provides that any excess amounts will be released back to the
manufacturer. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-31-103(a)(2)(B)(ii); Master Settlement Agreement, supra
note 19, at app. T. The remaining money in the escrow account is released back to the
manufacturer only to pay judgments and settlements resulting from lawsuits brought by the
states, and any money remaining after twenty-five years from the date that money was deposited
would also be disbursed back to the NPM. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-31-103(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Master
Settlement Agreement, supra note 19, at app. T.
163. O'BRIEN, supra note 156, at 5.
164. TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE, supra note 26, at 9 (follow the subheading "Prevelance of
Smoking Cessation Among Adults"); cf. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: NATIONAL HEALTH
INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2008, at 66-69 tbls.24-25, available at http://www.cdc.govinchs/
data/series/sr_10/sr10_242.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS] (finding that 37
percent of adults under sixty-five years of age who are covered by Medicaid are current smokers).
The percentage of Medicaid recipients under sixty-five years of age who smoke is higher than the
percentage of the adult population, in general, who smoke. In 2006, only 20.6 percent of the adult
population (eighteen years of age and older) smoked. TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE, supra note 26, at
tbl.4. Smoking prevalence also declines with increased education. Id. at 4 (follow the subheading
"Prevalence of Cigarette Use Among Adults: Smoking by Educational Attainment"). In 2005, 27
percent of smokers had less than twelve years of education, whereas only 9 percent of smokers
had more than sixteen years of education. Id. at tbl.15.
In addition, Medicaid recipients are, in general, in poorer health than individuals with
private insurance and individuals without insurance. See SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS, supra,
at 19-20 (noting that Medicaid recipients were more likely to be told that they had heart disease,
hypertension, and stroke than individuals with private insurance or individuals without
insurance); id. at 21-22 (noting that Medicaid recipients had a higher incidence of emphysema,
asthma, and chronic bronchitis than individuals with private insurance and individuals without
insurance); see also id. at 28-39 (noting that Medicaid recipients had a higher incidence of
diabetes, ulcers, kidney disease, liver disease, arthritis, chronic joint symptoms, migraine
headaches, neck pain, lower back pain, or pain in the face or jaw, hearing trouble, vision trouble,
and the absence of all natural teeth, than individuals with private insurance or individuals
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transition from (A) to (B) requires more. To treat passing costs as de
facto payments requires the application of the principle mentioned
earlier: substance over form. 165 In form, the transaction involves three
parties: Medicaid-covered smokers, tobacco companies, and the states.
In substance, however, the transaction involves two parties: Medicaid-
covered smokers and the states. The tobacco companies serve as a
mere conduit through which a payment passes on its way to its MSA-
mandated destination.
Similar situations have arisen in other contexts, and courts
applying the substance-over-form principle have ignored the
intermediary. In Brown v. United States, for example, the Ninth
Circuit applied the "step-transaction doctrine," a doctrine expressly
sanctioned by the Supreme Court,166 to ignore the intermediary in a
payment to the IRS. 167 This doctrine collapses "formally distinct steps"
into one in order to obtain a more "realistic" view of the transaction.168
The doctrine is applied to transactions in which the intermediary
serves as a mere conduit through the funds pass; in such cases, the
intermediary serves as a "fleeting stop in a predetermined voyage
toward a particular result."169 The Brown case itself involved an
individual giving his spouse funds, who in turn had given the funds to
the IRS as taxes on a gift.170 The goal was to defer estate taxes.171 Yet,
because the ultimate recipient of the funds-the IRS-had been
decided before the funds were given to the spouse, the court ignored
the intermediary and treated the transaction as one between the
husband and the IRS. 172
Courts have adopted a variety of tests to determine the proper
context for application of the step-transaction doctrine. The two most
without insurance). Poor families, in general, are two to three times as likely to have "fair or poor
health" compared to non-poor families. Id. at 10.
165. Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2007).
166. Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
167. 329 F.3d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. Id. at 671 (quoting Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989)).
169. Id. at 672.
170. Id. at 667-68.
171. Id. at 667.
172. Id. at 672. For other cases applying the step-transaction doctrine, see Kornfeld v.
Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying form over substance doctrine in
circumstances involving gifts to daughters and secretary); Robino Inc. Pension Trust v. Comm'r,
894 F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1990) (attributing gain to taxpayers instead of their trusts); Stewart
v. Comm'r, 714 F.2d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 1983) (attributing income of corporation to its 100 percent
owner).
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common tests are the "end-result" and "interdependence" tests. 173
Under the end-result test, implicitly used in Brown, the doctrine
applies when the distinct steps in the transaction were part of an
overall attempt to accomplish, from the outset, the end actually
achieved by the transaction.174 In the words of the Supreme Court:
"[A] given result at the end of straight path is not made a different
result because reached by following a devious path."7 5 Under the
interdependence test, the issue is whether "the individual steps in a
series had independent significance or whether they had meaning only
as part of the larger transaction." 176 When each step in the overall
transaction depends on the previous step and has no independent
economic justification, the intermediary should be ignored. 177
Under either test, the step-transaction doctrine should apply to
the transactions between Medicaid-covered smokers, Big Tobacco, and
the states. Big Tobacco, as the intermediary, should be ignored in the
transaction. The "end result" of the transactions is that payments are
made to the states; indeed, this is why Big Tobacco increased the price
of cigarettes.178 Similarly, it is highly unlikely that Big Tobacco would
have increased the price of cigarettes as much as it did had the MSA
not been executed. 79 The two steps-increasing the price of cigarettes
and paying the states-are dependent upon another. Thus, under
173. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.
1991); see also Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing both tests); McDonald's Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same); King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (same).
174. See King Enters., 418 F.2d at 516 ("[S]eparate transactions will be amalgamated into a
single transaction when it appears that they were really component parts of a single transaction
intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result.").
175. Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
176. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1246.
177. See id. at 1247 (explaining that under the independence test, courts examine the
"tandem of transactional totalities to determine whether each step had a reasoned economic
justification standing alone"). Intermediaries are ignored in other context as well. See, e.g.,
Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363-64 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding indirect gifts of stock and
ignoring intermediate recipients who subsequently transferred stock to decedent's family
members); Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding Department
of Health and Human Services did not violate § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act when
the Department issued new directives through intermediary private agency); Griffin v. United
States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (noting that "the plaintiffs engaged in a clever
and sophisticated scheme by which [the wife] was merely the intermediary through which the
stock passed on its way to the ultimate beneficiary, the Trust" and disregarding the
intermediary).
178. The first transaction should not be construed as the purchase of a package of cigarettes,
but rather the payment of the increase.
179. Cf. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1247 (finding the "individual components so
interrelated that no single step would likely have been taken had the others not followed').
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either test, the intermediary should be ignored and substance should
prevail over form.
4. The Purpose of the Payments
Applying the step-transaction doctrine provides a more
accurate view of the transaction: 180 Medicaid-covered smokers make
de facto payments to the states. But proposition (B) goes even further
and indicates that these payments are for Medicaid. The purpose of
the payments is found in the states' complaints: the states sought to
recoup the costs of both past and future medical treatment of tobacco-
related disease in Medicaid-covered smokers.' 8' Thus, the purpose of
the MSA is to fund the states' Medicaid expenditures on tobacco-
related disease,182 and the transition to (B) is complete. Through the
price increases on cigarettes, Medicaid-covered smokers make de facto
payments to the states for their Medicaid coverage.
At this point, one may object that the first premise ignores an
entire class of individuals: non-Medicaid-covered smokers. Further,
one may object that non-Medicaid-covered smokers also make de facto
payments to the states for the coverage of Medicaid-covered smokers.
Moreover, the objection would continue, if Medicaid-covered smokers
making de facto payments for their own coverage violates the Act
(anticipating the second premise), then non-Medicaid-covered smokers
making de facto payments for Medicaid-covered smokers' coverage
violates the Act in a much more blatant way.
There are at least two possible responses to this objection.
First, relative to non-Medicaid-covered smokers, an application of the
principle that substance prevails over form shows that these payments
180. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989).
181. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stovall v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 96-CV-919, T 264(H)
(Kan. Dist. Ct. Shawnee County Aug. 20, 1996) (seeking "damages and compensation ... for past
and future damages, including but not limited to health care expenditures"); State v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. 95-7378, 217(F) (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1995), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edultobaccollitigation/ma/8macomplaint.pdf (same); State ex rel.
Montgomery v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-CV-HO5-5114, 1 373(1) (Oh. Ct. Common Pleas,
Franklin County, May 8, 1997) (same); McGraw ex rel. West Virginia v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-
1707, $ 155(a) (Cir. Ct. Kanawha County Sept. 20, 1994) (seeking "damages in an amount which
is sufficient to provide restitution and re-pay the State for the sums the State has expended on
account of the defendant's wrongful conduct, including, without limitation, costs for medical
care").
182. These were recoupment suits, so perhaps the point goes without saying. Vandall
summarizes the legal theory behind recoupment suits: "[T]he states should be able to sue in
order to recover the costs of treating disease and illness caused by cigarette smoking." Vandall,
supra note 9, at 478.
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are de facto taxes.183 As will be addressed in the second premise,
relative to Medicaid-covered smokers, the principle demonstrates that
these payments are de facto premiums. The two groups, in other
words, are distinct in legally significant ways.184
Second, even admitting the validity of this objection, it fails to
impact the analysis offered in this Note. That is, this Note makes no
claims of exclusivity; there are likely other problems with the MSA.
Analyzing the MSA relative to other groups, like non-Medicaid-
covered smokers, may reveal differences between that group and
general taxpayers and thus violations of a unique sort. That analysis,
however, is outside the scope of this Note, which is confined to the
MSA relative to Medicaid-covered smokers.
B. The Second Premise: The Social Security Act
Private health-insurance companies usually require
participants to pay an enrollment fee, a monthly premium,
copayments, or coinsurance. In 2006, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA"), which
amended the Act and made Medicaid more like private health
insurance by allowing the states to impose certain charges under
specified conditions.185 One part of the DRA, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1396o-1, authorizes the use of enrollment fees, premiums, and other
cost-sharing programs such as copayments and coinsurance. 186 States
impose enrollment fees and premiums regardless of whether the
Medicaid recipient receives services or obtains medical treatment. By
contrast, states impose copayments and coinsurance charges only if
the recipient actually receives services or obtains treatment.187
183. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 220 (construing the MSA as a de facto tax
imposed without legislation); W. Kip Viscusi, Tobacco: Regulation and Taxation through
Litigation, in REGUIATION THROUGH LITIGATION 23 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (construing the
MSA as a tax on cigarettes); W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Tobacco Regulation through
Litigation: The Master Settlement Agreement 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper 15422, 2009) (describing the MSA as "imposing a de facto tax" on cigarettes and noting
that the MSA was "pathbreaking in that it did not involve a damages payment that took a
conventional form, but instead imposed the equivalent of a per pack cigarette tax that was called
a 'settlement' payment")
184. Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 183, at 1, for example, note that, under the MSA, a "tax
was imposed without legislative approval, and national regulations were enacted without the
usual rulemaking process." See also DERTHICK, supra note 30, at 220 (observing the same).
185. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2010); see also Robert Pear, New Medicaid Rules Allow
States to Set Premiums and Higher Co-Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A25 (explaining
that under the DRA states can establish a sliding scale for premiums and co-payments).
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(a)(1).
187. ELICIA J. HERZ, MEDICAID COST-SHARING UNDER THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005
(DRA) 1-3 (Congressional Research Services) (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts
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Medicaid-covered smokers188 make de facto payments for their
Medicaid whether they actually receive treatment or not; the
payments are built into the purchase of cigarettes. Thus, the de facto
payments are best construed as de facto premiums, not de facto cost-
sharing payments such as copayments or coinsurance. Further, the
Act places restrictions on when states can impose a premium on
Medicaid recipients. Thus, the issue is whether the de facto premiums
paid by Medicaid-covered smokers fit within the restrictions in the
law.189
1. Premium Restrictions
Sections 1396o and 1396o-1 govern the use of premiums by the
states. The general rule is flexible: "[A] State, at its option and
through a State plan amendment, may impose premiums and cost
sharing for any group of individuals (as specified by the State) and for
any type of services ... and may vary such premiums and cost sharing
among such groups or types . . . ."190 Yet there are limitations on a
state's ability to impose premiums. Any premium must be "consistent
with the limitations established under [§ 1396o-1]."191 Section 1396o-1
contains ten categories of individuals for whom premiums are either
IRS22578_20070125.pdf (introducing the differences between premiums and copayments under
DRA).
188 As this Note was going to press, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("PPACA"). Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23,
2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18001) (West 2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Mar. 30, 2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1305). Although the ramifications of healthcare reform on Medicaid-
covered smokers, the MSA, and the tobacco industry are uncertain, it appears the law expands
Medicaid coverage, as early reports indicated. See, e.g., James R. Carroll, Area Lawmakers
Assess Bill Impact, COURIER J. (Louisville), Mar. 22, 2010, at Al (noting that the bill "[e]xpands
the federal-state Medicaid insurance program"). Recent guidance from the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services addresses § 2001 of the PPACA, "Medicaid Coverage for the Lowest
Income Populations." Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Letter, SMDL No. 10-005, PPACA No. 1, Re: New Option for Coverage of
Individuals under Medicaid (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.cms.gov
/smdl/downloads/SMD10005.PDF. Section 2001 of the PPACA amends § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i) of the
Act by establishing a new, relatively broad category of individuals eligible for Medicaid coverage:
Individuals "under 65 years of age, not pregnant, not entitled to, or enrolled for, [Medicare Part
A], or enrolled for [Medicare Part B], and are not [described in a separate category], and whose
income . . . does not exceed 133 percent of the poverty line . . . subject to subsection (k)." Pub. L.
111-148, § 2001(a)(1)(A)-(C). Subsection (k) gives states the option of providing assistance to this
new category of individuals until compliance is mandatory in 2014. Id. Thus, assuming some new
Medicaid recipients smoke, the number of Medicaid-covered smokers will increase.
189. I do not consider whether the de facto payments are enrollment fees because the de
facto payments are ongoing, whereas an enrollment fee is a one-time fee imposed when the
recipient initially enrolls in the state's Medicaid plan.
190. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(a)(1).
191. Id.
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limited or prohibited. Seven of the categories for whom premiums are
prohibited are quite distinct:
Individuals under 18 years of age that are required to be provided medical assistance
under section 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) 192 of this title ....
Pregnant women.
Any terminally ill individual who is receiving hospice care ....
Any individual who is an inpatient in a [medical institution], if such individual is
required . . . to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of the
individual's income required for personal needs.
Women who are receiving medical assistance by virtue of the application of sections
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVIII) of this title and 1396a(aa) of this title.1sa
Disabled children who are receiving medical assistance by virtue of the application of
sections 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIX) and 1396a(cc) of this title.
194
An Indian who is furnished an item or service directly by the Indian Health Service, an
Indian Tribe, Tribal Organization or Urban Indian Organization or through referral
under contract health services." 5
The other three categories within § 1396o-1 are broad and
defined in terms of income. First, for an "individual whose family
income does not exceed 100 percent of the poverty line applicable to a
family of the size involved," § 1396o prohibits premiums for
individuals within the categories listed at § 1396a(a)(10)(A) and
(E)(i).196 These two categories cover the overwhelming majority of
Medicaid recipients, including, among many others, individuals
receiving "aid or assistance under any plan of the State" such as Old
Age Assistance, individuals who are blind or permanently and totally
disabled, and individuals receiving Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, or AFDC, benefits.197 Section 1396a(a)(10)(A) also prohibits
192. This provision itself describes seven categories of individuals, including, for example,
individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income benefits. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I)-(VII) (listing the categories). Thus, premiums are prohibited for any
individual who is (a) under eighteen years of age and (b) a member of one of the seven categories
listed in this provision. Id. § 1396o-1(b)(3)(A).
193. These provisions describe certain breast and cervical cancer patients.
194. These provisions describe certain disabled children.
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(b)(3)(A)(i)-(vii).
196. Id. § 1396o-1(a)(2)(A). In 2009, the Federal Poverty Line for a family of four was
$22,050. For a single individual, it was $10,830. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines,
74 Fed. Reg. 14, 4199-4201 (Jan. 23, 2009).
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). For the full list of individuals for whom premiums
are prohibited under § 1396o, see §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) and 1396a(a)(10)(E)(i). There is, of course,
an exception to this rule: Under § 1396o(c), states may charge premiums for an individual "who
is receiving medical assistance on the basis of § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IX) of this title and whose
family income . . . equals or exceeds 150 percent of the income official poverty line . . . applicable
to a family of the size involved." Further, individuals who receive medical assistance under §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IX) are described in that section as individuals "who are described in
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premiums for a number of individuals who would be eligible for aid or
assistance from a state plan, but who are ineligible for a variety of
reasons, including, for example, being in an institution or having
earnings in excess of statutory limits.1 98
Second, § 1396o-1 prohibits premiums for an "individual whose
family income exceeds 100 percent, but does not exceed 150 percent, of
the poverty line applicable to a family of the size involved."199 Third,
for an "individual whose family income exceeds 150 percent of the
poverty line applicable to a family of the size involved," § 1396o-1
allows premiums within certain limits. 200 The total premium assessed
on all individuals in the family, together with any other cost sharing
the State may have imposed, cannot exceed "5 percent of the family
income."201
2. The Violation
For any Medicaid-covered smoker who is a member of one of
the seven distinct groups, charging a premium constitutes a violation
of § 1396o-1. For any Medicaid-covered smoker whose family income is
between 100 and 150 percent of the poverty line, premiums also
constitute violations of § 1396o-1. The same rule applies to any
Medicaid-covered smoker whose income is less 100 percent of the
poverty level. Finally, for any Medicaid-covered smoker whose income
is greater 150 percent of the poverty line, the premium may constitute
a violation of § 1396o-1, if the premium exceeds the 5 percent limit of
the smoker's family income.
As established above, Medicaid-covered smokers are being
charged just these sorts of premiums in the form of increased prices on
their cigarettes resulting from the MSA. Because these increased costs
function as de facto Medicaid premiums, they also serve as violations
of § 1396o-1. Without some way to remedy this situation, states are
effectively violating the Act on an ongoing basis through their
adherence to the MSA arrangement.
subjection (1)(1) of this section and not described in clause (i)(IV), clause (i)(VI), or clause (i)(VII)."
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(ii)(IX).
198. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(ii)(IV), (XV).
199. Id. § 1396o-1(b)(1)(A).
200. Id. § 1396o-1(b)(2)(A).
201. Id. For example, if a recipient's family had income of 160 percent of the poverty line, the
maximum allowable monthly premium would be $147.
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IV. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
This Part addresses the remedies available to Medicaid-covered
smokers. Part IV.A discusses the Secretary's power to revoke funding
for states that fail to comply with the Act. Hurdles to effective
enforcement of this remedy cast doubt on its value to Medicaid-
covered smokers. Part IV.B addresses the possibility of a § 1983 action
against the states. The value of this remedy depends primarily upon
on whether the Act's premium provisions are construed as enforceable
under Supreme Court precedent. While one may make a strong case
for enforcement of the Act's premium provisions, the de facto status of
the violation itself likely leaves Medicaid-covered smokers with a
choice, addressed in Part IV.C: quit smoking or pay unlawful
premiums for Medicaid.
A. The Secretary's Idle Power
If a state has a Medicaid program, its program must comply
with the federal Medicaid statute.202 The Act itself provides a remedy
for violations by vesting authority in the Secretary of Health and
Human Services ("Secretary") to withhold funds from states until they
"comply substantially" with the Act.203 Despite the Secretary's power,
there are several reasons why it is unlikely that this power will be
exercised in regard to the MSA, some of which are not unique to the
context of Medicaid-covered smokers. 204 First, in relation to Medicaid,
the Department of Health and Human Services primarily plays a
fund-reimbursing role, which is inconsistent with the "antagonistic
role of a rule enforcer" that penalizes a state by withholding funds. 205
Second, the Secretary's only remedy under § 1396c is to withhold
202. J.K. ex rel. R.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Ariz. 1993).
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (West 2010) ("If the Secretary, after reasonable notice and
opportunity for hearing to the State agency administering or supervising the administration of
the State plan . . . finds . . . that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply
substantially with any such provision; the Secretary shall notify such State agency that further
payments will not be made to the State . . . until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no
longer be any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied he shall make no further payments
to such State.").
204. See Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The
Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
283, 292-93 (1996) (providing reasons why federal agencies fail to enforce compliance in the
context of grant-in-aid programs, in general).
205. Id. at 292; see also Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of
Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L.
REV. 600, 620 (1972) ("The posture of the federal agency toward its grantees is not generally that
of a referee calling fouls, but that of a coach giving support in the form of cash and expertise.").
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federal funds from the states, which would ultimately result in the
states' cutting Medicaid coverage-a harsh "remedy" for individuals
dependent on that coverage for even the most basic medical care. 206
Third, before the Secretary could withhold funds, a hearing would be
required to determine if the state is in compliance. 207 Given that no
party to the MSA-either the state or the tobacco companies-has an
incentive to present evidence of a violation at a hearing, the hearing
requirement presents an additional hurdle to the Secretary's
exercising § 1396c authority.
B. Section 1983 Action
Given the low probability that the Secretary will enforce
compliance with the Medicaid statute's premium restrictions,
Medicaid-covered smokers may instead wish to bring an action against
their states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which prohibits the deprivation of
rights secured by federal law by persons acting under color of state
law. 208
1. Section 1983 and the Social Security Act
The Supreme Court has often assumed, without analysis, that
the Act confers rights enforceable through § 1983.209 In Rosado v.
Wyman, for example, the Court held, without explanation, that "suits
206. Key, supra note 204, at 292-93. The harshness of this remedy is tempered by the
Secretary's discretionary ability to withhold only funds that are related to the state's failure to
comply. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (permitting the Secretary to "limit payments to categories under
or parts of the State plan not affected by such failure" to comply).
207. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c.
208. Id. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress . . . .").
209. See Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and
the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 613, 619 (noting that "the Court in the
1970s began to assume, without discussion, that plaintiffs could use § 1983 to enforce provisions
of the Social Security Act"); see also Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 146 (1979) (holding that the
Illinois policy of excluding foster care benefits to children residing with a relative was
inconsistent with the Social Security Act and granting plaintiffs request for injunctive relief);
Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1975) (granting injunctive relief against welfare
regulation inconsistent with the Act); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971) (enforcing,
without analysis, § 406(a)(2) of the Act). There was, however, dicta in a 1966 decision on which
the Court may have been relying in the Social Security cases: In City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
the Court noted that state actors may be liable for violations of "statutory rights" in addition to
constitutional rights. 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966); see also Davant, supra, at 619 (suggesting the
same).
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in federal court under [§] 1983 are proper to secure compliance with
the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of the
participating States."210 In King v. Smith, the Court generally cited in
two footnotes a student note that relied on the broad language of §
1983.211 The student note provided that, "The 'rights, privileges, and
immunities' language of section 1983 is deliberately broad, and a
properly expansive construction would include the right to treatment
by state welfare officials consistent with the federal statute."212 Until
1980, this general citation was as much analysis as the Court would
give.
The Court first provided a justification for inclusion of
statutory rights, including rights conferred by the Social Security Act,
in Maine v. Thiboutot.213 In Thiboutot, the plaintiffs challenged an
interpretation of the Act by the Maine Department of Human Services
that decreased the plaintiffs' welfare benefits by failing to account for
money spent on certain dependent children.214 The Court framed the
issue as whether the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 "means what it says,
or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws."2 15 Based on
the "plain language" of the statute, including the absence of any
phrases modifying "laws," the Court held that the statute
"undoubtedly embraces respondent's claim that petitioners violated
the Social Security Act."2 1 6
2. The Blessing Test
Throughout the 1980s, the Court moved away from its analysis
in Thiboutot to one relying on a distinction between obligatory
statutes, which confer rights enforceable through § 1983, and "merely
precatory" statutes, which do not.2 1 7 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
210. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675
(1974)).
211. Kling v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313 (1968) (citing Note, Federal Judicial Review of State
Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 84 (1967)).
212. Note, supra note 211, at 110.
213. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987)
(examining congressional intent in holding that the statute conferred a "right" enforceable under
§ 1983); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (inquiring whether
Congress "imposed an obligation on the States . . . or whether it spoke merely in precatory terms"
when deciding whether the statute at issue-the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill




Association, the Court held that § 1983 protects only deprivations of
"rights, privileges, or immunities," not all violations of federal law. 218
Whether a provision creates a federal right, the Court explained,
depends on whether the provision was "intend[ed] to benefit the
putative plaintiff."219 If the provision was so intended, then it creates
an enforceable right, with two exceptions. 220 First, the provision does
not create an enforceable right if it merely reflects a nonbinding
preference for a particular course of conduct.221 Second, no enforceable
right exists if the interest is too "vague and amorphous" to be enforced
by courts. 222 Applying this test to the "reasonable and adequate"
provision applicable to Medicaid reimbursement rates, the Court held
that the Act created rights enforceable by healthcare providers
through § 1983.223 Further, the Court held that neither exception
applied, for the text of the provision itself was cast in mandatory
terms and the reasonableness of a reimbursement rate was not beyond
the competency of courts to adjudicate.224
The Court modified, albeit slightly, the Wilder test in Blessing
v. Freestone.225 Rather than a general rule with two exceptions as in
Wilder, the Blessing test states three factors for determining whether
a statute creates a right enforceable through § 1983:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute
is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.2
26
The Blessing Court also required that § 1983 plaintiffs assert a right
grounded in a specific provision of a law, not a law as an
"undifferentiated whole."22 7 "Only when the complaint is broken down
into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each
separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for
determining whether a federal statute creates rights."228 Rights not
grounded in a specific provision of the statute may, like the right to
"substantial compliance" asserted by the plaintiffs in Blessing, fail to
218. 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
103, 106 (1989)).
219. Id. (citing Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106).
220. Id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106, 110).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 509-10.
224. Id. at 512, 519.
225. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
226. Id. at 340-41 (internal citations omitted).
227. Id. at 342.
228. Id.
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meet the first requirement-that the provision in question be intended
to benefit the plaintiff.
3. Gonzaga and Congressional Intent
While the Blessing test remained settled law throughout the
1990s, beginning in 2001, the Court shifted emphasis to the first
prong of the test: whether Congress intended to confer an enforceable
right.229 In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court explained that
congressional intent to confer individual rights can be inferred from
the "text and structure" of the statute. 230 More specifically, the Court
now looks for rights-creating language that is focused on the
"individuals protected," not the "persons regulated."231 Provisions that
focus on aggregate activity are also insufficient. 2 32 Once rights are
established, they are "presumptively enforceable." 233
4. Medicaid Rights Post-Gonzaga
a. The Equal-Access Provision
Circuit courts applying Gonzaga to the provisions of the Social
Security Act have reached differing results as to whether a particular
provision confers rights enforceable through § 1983. The so-called
"equal-access provision" of the Social Security Act, § 1396a(a)(30), has
been held by all but one circuit not to confer rights enforceable
through § 1983.234 The equal-access provision requires that "care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such
229. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282, 284-86 (2002); see also Westside Mothers v.
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Gonzaga Court "acknowledged the
continuing relevance of the Blessing test 'to guide judicial inquiry into whether or not a statute
confers a right' " (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282)). This is the same inquiry applied in the
implied right of action context. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285.
230. 536 U.S. at 286.
231. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001).
232. Cf. Gonzaga, 526 U.S. at 282 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343) ("Because [Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act] focused on 'the aggregate services provided by the State,' rather than
'the needs of any particular person,' it conferred no individual rights and thus could not be
enforced by § 1983.").
233. Id. at 284. The specific provision on which the Gonzaga plaintiff relied, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1232g(b)(1), which is part of the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act, addresses the
Secretary of Education, directing the Secretary to withhold funds if a school has a policy or
practice of disclosing information without parental consent. This is "two steps removed" from the
kind of language that confers individual rights, the Court stated. Id. at 287. In addition, the
FERPA provision addresses the policies and practices of schools, "not individual instances of
disclosure." Id. at 288. The plaintiff in Gonzaga was left without a remedy. Id. at 287-88.
234. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
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care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area."235 The First Circuit, in Long Term Care Pharmacy
Alliance v. Ferguson, was the first circuit to address this provision
and, relying on Gonzaga, held that it did not confer rights on medical
providers enforceable through § 1983.236 The court noted that the
provision has no "rights creating language," "identifies no discrete
class of beneficiaries," and "focuses . . . upon the state as 'the person
regulated rather than individuals protected.' "237 Moreover, the generic
nature of the criteria in the equal-access provision-"avoiding overuse,
efficiency, quality of care, geographic equality"-suggest that
enforcement was to remain the sole province of the Secretary. 238 The
majority of other circuits soon followed suit.2 39
b. The Availability Provision
Not all provisions of the Social Security Act have suffered such
a fate in the circuit courts. The availability provision, § 1396a(a)(10),
requires that a state's Medicaid plan "provide for making medical
assistance available ... to all [qualified] individuals."240 The Third,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have addressed the provision, and all three
agree that it confers rights enforceable through § 1983.
235. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(30) (West 2010).
236. 362 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Gardella, supra note 15, at 733-35 (discussing
the case).
237. Long Term Care, 362 F.3d at 57 (internal citations omitted).
238. Id. at 58. The importance of generic guidelines for measuring compliance was not
introduced by the Gonzaga majority, but rather by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in
that case. Given the multitude of interpretations possible, such flexible guidelines, according to
Justice Breyer, manifests a congressional intent to vest enforcement solely in the agency
administering the program (e.g., the Secretary). Precluding private enforcement through § 1983
in such cases tends to "avoid the comparative risk of inconsistent interpretations and
misincentives that can arise out of an occasional inappropriate application of the statute in a
private action for damages." Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 292 (Breyer, J., concurring).
239. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007); Mandy R.
ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v.
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit to both address the enforceability of the equal-
access provision and hold that it is enforceable. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the beneficiaries of the
provision "are both the recipients of the services and the recipients of the state's payment," and
stating that "[tihe statute is clear on its scope: to ensure payments are not too high, but yet high
enough to secure the participation of enough clinics so that needy children receive equal access to
health care").
240. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10).
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The Third Circuit, in Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richrman, was the
first circuit to address this provision after Gonzaga.241 Applying the
Blessing test, the Sabree court held that Congress intended to benefit
the plaintiffs, a class of developmentally disabled Medicaid recipients
who had been denied access to an intermediate-care medical facility.242
The right to treatment in such a facility was sufficiently "specific and
enumerated" to meet the second prong of the test, and the provision
was mandatory, binding the states to provide medical assistance to
the plaintiffs. 243 Applying Gonzaga, the Sabree court held that the
provision contained adequate rights-creating language. Comparing the
availability provision to two paradigmatic rights-creating statutes,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, the Sabree court found it "difficult, if not
impossible, as a linguistic matter" to distinguish the "[a] State plan
must provide" of the availability provision from the "no person shall"
of the two paradigm statutes. 244 Moreover, the availability provision
does not focus on the person regulated but, rather, the Medicaid
recipients-that is, the "individuals protected."245 The court thus
concluded that Medicaid recipients have, in the availability provision,
a right enforceable through § 1983.246
The Fifth Circuit, in South Dakota ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, also
held that the availability provision creates a right enforceable through
§ 1983.247 Like the Sabree court, the Dickson court compared the
provision's language to the paradigmatic statutes and held that it
contains sufficient rights-creating language. 248 The plaintiff in
Dickson, a sixteen-year-old Medicaid recipient with spina bifida, also
asserted a specific right to a medical device deemed necessary by the
recipient's healthcare provider. 2 49 This right was far from "vague and
241. 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Devi M. Rao, Note, "Making Medical Assistance
Available": Enforcing the Medicaid Act's Availability Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 1440, 1463-67 (2009) (discussing the provision and the three circuit court
decisions addressing it).
242. Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190.
243. Id. at 189-90.
244. Id. at 190; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2010) ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, . . . be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West
2010) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
245. Sabree, 367 F.3d at 190 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532, U.S. 275, 289 (2001)).
246. Id. at 192.
247. 391 F.3d 581, 607 (5th Cir. 2004).
248. Id. at 602-03.
249. Id. at 584, 605.
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amorphous."250 The Dickson court's analysis went further than Sabree
in considering the statutory context of the provision. As part of the
Act's requirements for all state Medicaid plans, the provision is
addressed to the states. This focus on the states, the court nonetheless
noted, is insufficient to foreclose enforcement through § 1983, given §
1320a-2's express statement as to enforceability. 2 51 Satisfying both
Blessing and Gonzaga, the Dickson court held that the availability
provision was enforceable through § 1983.252
c. Other Enforceable Provisions
Post-Gonzaga courts have held that other provisions of the
Social Security Act are also enforceable through § 1983. In Bryson v.
Shumway, the First Circuit held that § 1396a(a)(8) is enforceable
through § 1983.253 Under this provision, a state's Medicaid plan
"must" provide medical assistance "with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals."254
In Gean v. Hattaway, the Sixth Circuit held that § 1396a(a)(3)
is enforceable through § 1983.255 This provision requires a state's
Medicaid plan to "provide for granting an opportunity for a fair
hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with
reasonable promptness."256 Finally, in Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, the
Second Circuit held that § 1396r-6 is enforceable through § 1983.257
Under § 1396r-6, which applies to recipients whose Medicaid is
terminated, "each State plan approved under this subchapter must
provide that each family which was receiving aid ... in at least 3 of
the 6 months immediately preceding the month in which [Medicaid
was terminated] shall . .. remain eligible for assistance under the
plan ... during the immediately succeeding 6-month period."258
250. Id. at 605 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)).
251. Id. at 603. The provision reads: "In an action brought to enforce a provision of [the Act],
such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of this
chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan." 42 U.S.C.A. §
1320a-2 (West 2010).
252. The Ninth Circuit relied on both Sabree and Dickson in Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152,
1160-61 (9th Cir. 2006), holding that the availability provision is enforceable through § 1983.
253. 308 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2002).
254. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West 2010).
255. 330 F.3d 758, 773 (6th Cir. 2003).
256. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3).
257. 362 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2004).
258. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-6.
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Given all of the enforceable rights already established in the
Act, what about the prohibitions on premiums? In the absence of
precedent on the premium provisions, how would a court decide?
d. The Premium Provisions
Medicaid-covered smokers have a strong argument, based on
both pre- and post-Gonzaga precedent, that the premium provisions
are enforceable through § 1983. The pre-Gonzaga Supreme Court
cases of King, Townsend, Van Lare, and Rosado all endorse the view
that § 1983 actions are "proper to secure compliance with the
provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of the participating
states."259 Although pre-Gonzaga cases are not as persuasive as those
decided after Gonzaga, they remain quite relevant. In Watson v.
Weeks, decided in 2006, the Ninth Circuit joined the Third and Fifth
Circuits in holding that the availability provision is enforceable
through § 1983.260 On the Watson court's view, however, it was joining
not only the Third and Fifth Circuits, but also the Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits-all of which decided the issue before Gonzaga.261
Likewise, in Dickson, the Fifth Circuit stated that its decision that the
availability provision is enforceable through § 1983 "is amply
supported by" pre-Gonzaga decisions.262
After Blessing, the § 1983 analysis is provision-specific. Unlike
other Medicaid-based § 1983 actions, a claim based on unlawful
premiums would not be restricted to a single provision. The Act
contains a multitude of premium provisions, each applicable to its own
category of recipients. 263 Thus, an action brought by Medicaid-covered
smokers would likely include several classes of plaintiffs, depending
upon the categories of premium provisions implicated. As an example,
one class might consist of all Medicaid-covered smokers whose family
income is greater than 100 percent of the poverty level, but less than
150 percent of the poverty level. For this class, the unlawful premium
would violate § 1396o-1(b)(1)(A). Once the provision is selected in
259. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
422-23 (1970)).
260. 436 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006).
261. See id. at 1159-60 & n.8 ("In holding that this statutory provision creates a right
enforceable by section 1983, we join five federal circuits that have already so held." (citing the
pre-Gonzaga cases Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002); Pediatric
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 293 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2002); Miller v.
Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993))).
262. 391 F.3d at 604 (citing Mitchell v. Johnson, 701 F.2d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1983); Pediatric
Specialty Care, Inc., 293 F.3d at 479; Miller, 10 F.3d at 1319-20).
263. See infra, tbl.3.
2010] 1123
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
accord with the appropriate category of Medicaid recipient, the
Blessing test, along with Gonzaga's emphasis on congressional intent,
would be applied to the provision to determine whether the recipients
have an enforceable right.
The analysis would begin with the text of the provision. For
relevant purposes, there are four premium provisions:
TABLE III. PREMIUM PROVISIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 13960-1264
Subsection "No premiums shall be imposed under this
(b)(3)(A)(i)-(vii) section with respect to [the seven categories of
(The Seven individuals described at (i)-(vii)]."
Discrete Categories)
"In the case of an individual whose family
Subsection (b)(1)(A) income" is between 100-150 percent of the
poverty line, "no premium may be imposed
under the plan."
"In the case of an individual whose family
income" exceeds 150 percent of the poverty
Subsection (b)(2)(A) line, "the total aggregate amount of premiums
and other cost sharing .. . may not exceed 5
percent" of the family income.
"[I]n the case of individuals described in"
Subsection (a)(2)(A) subsections (A) or (E)(i) "who are eligible under
the plan . .. no enrollment fee [or] premium ...
will be imposed under the plan."
Several aspects of the § 1983 analysis would apply equally to all four
provisions. All of the provisions, for example, are requirements of a
state's Medicaid plan; they direct the states to establish a plan in
accord with their restrictions. Under § 1320a-2, this is not enough to
deem the provisions unenforceable through § 1983.265 In addition, a
reviewing court would likely apply the second prong of the Blessing
test similarly across provisions. Medicaid recipients would assert the
right to receive medical assistance without a premium or for a
premium within statutory limits. Neither right is so "vague and
amorphous" that enforcement of the right would "strain judicial
competence." 266 If a right to "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement
264. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2010).
265. Id. § 1320a-2.
266. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)).
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rates is sufficiently clear to adjudicate, 26 7 then so is a right to
premium-free Medicaid or Medicaid with a premium within statutory
limits, given the amount of debate possible over reasonableness. 268
The third prong of the Blessing test would likewise apply
similarly across the four premium provisions: Do each of the
provisions "unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
States"? 269 All four provisions satisfy this prong with mandatory
language. 270 This language is comparable to that of the language of
the two paradigmatic rights-conferring statutes, "No person ...
shall,"271 as well as other enforceable Medicaid provisions where, for
example, the state's plan "must provide" for hearings or "must
provide" temporary assistance.272 Put Simply, the premium provisions
forbid a state from imposing a premium in any of the prohibited
categorieS273 or a premium greater than 5 percent in the applicable
category. 274
Analysis of the first prong of the Blessing test, unlike the
second and third prongs, may differ depending on the specific
premium provision at issue. Yet even here there are similarities across
all four provisions. To satisfy the first prong, "Congress must have
intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff."275 All
four of the premium provisions benefit the prospective plaintiffs-the
Medicaid recipients who, by virtue of the provisions, are either not
forced to pay a premium for their medical assistance or have their
premiums capped at 5 percent of their family income. Further, the
premium provisions arguably do not benefit the states: prohibiting or
limiting premiums means less money to fund the states.
Provisions found unenforceable also shed light on the
requirements for enforcement. In the context of the (unenforceable)
equal-access provision, the Long Term Care court noted that §
267. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519 (1990).
268. Cf. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 (holding that a right to "substantial compliance" with the
requirements of the Social Security Act is unenforceable).
269. Id. at 341.
270. With emphasis on the key language, 42 U.S.C.A § 1396o-1(b)(3)(A) (West 2010) states
that "[n]o premiums shall be imposed." § 1396o-1(b)(1)(A) states that "no premium may be
imposed," and § 1396o-1(b)(2)(A) states that the premium "may not exceed. . .
271. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2010); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 2010).
272. Id. §§ 1396a(a)(3), r-6(a)(1)(A).
273. There are three broad categories of recipients for whom premiums are prohibited: (1)
the individuals described in § 1396o.1(b)(3)(A)(i)-(vii), (2) the individuals described in § 1396o-
1(b)(1)(A), and (3) the individuals described in 1396o-1(a)(2)(A).
274. That is, the individuals with family income exceeding 150 percent of the poverty line. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(b)(2)(A).
275. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
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1396a(a)(30) "identifies no discrete class of beneficiaries." 276 By
contrast, the premium provisions are rooted in "discrete class[es] of
beneficiaries." The best example of such classes is § 1396o-
1(b)(3)(A)(i)-(vii), which describes seven distinct categories of
recipients with detailed characteristics. Subsection (iv), for example,
identifies the rather specific class of recipients who are in a medical
institution, "if such individual is required, as a condition of receiving
services in such institution under the state plan, to spend for costs of
medical care all but a minimum amount of the individual's income for
personal needs." Even the broader provisions identify discrete classes
of recipients-namely, individuals whose family income falls within
one of three distinctly defined groups relative to the poverty line.
Therefore, the premium provisions focus on distinct classes of
recipients; no aggregate concerns are present. 277
In several post-Gonzaga decisions, rights-creating language
has been the linchpin to enforceability.2 78 These cases have relied on
the Gonzaga Court's emphasis on the "[n]o person shall" language in
the two paradigmatic statutes. In Sabree, the court found sufficient
similarity between the "[n]o person shall" of the paradigm statutes
and the "[a] State plan must provide" of the availability provision. 279
The Dickson court agreed. 280 The premium provisions contain similar
mandatory language. In addition, the language of the premium
provisions focuses primarily on the "individuals protected"-the
various categories of Medicaid recipients-and only secondarily on the
"person regulated"-the states.281 Much like the language of the
paradigm statutes, the premium provisions are "specific, mandatory,
[and] individually focused." 282
Medicaid-covered smokers have a viable argument for § 1983
enforcement of their right to either premium-free Medicaid or
premiums within the statutory limits. By failing to comply with the
premium restrictions in §1396o, Medicaid-covered smokers have been
deprived of the federal right secured by the Social Security Act.
276. Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
277. Cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002) (relying in part on the "aggregate"
focus of FERPA in holding that the statute is not enforceable through § 1983); Sanchez v.
Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying in part on the "aggregate" focus of the
equal-access provision when holding that it is unenforceable through § 1983).
278. See, e.g., Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004).
279. Id.
280. S.D. ex. rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 602 & n.28 (5th Cir. 2004).
281. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) (noting that "[sitatutes that focus
on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected" suggest no intent to confer
individual rights).
282. Sabree, 367 F.3d at 188.
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At the same time, the underlying violation is based on a de
facto payment. The de facto status of the payment may ultimately
undermine the strength of the § 1983 claim because, to even recognize
the violation, a reviewing court must apply the principle that
substance prevails over form. Some courts may be reluctant to apply
this principle, despite its common use in other contexts. Finally,
relative to the two paradigmatic rights-conferring statutes, a
reviewing court may see the premium provisions as ambiguous, and,
as the Gonzaga court said, nothing "short of an unambiguously
conferred right" will support a § 1983 action. 283
C. A Choice for Medicaid-Covered Smokers
The first step in the de facto premium transaction occurs when
the Medicaid-covered smoker purchases cigarettes at the MSA-
inflated price. Obviously, if the Medicaid-covered smoker stopped
purchasing cigarettes, no de facto premiums would be paid. But
cigarettes are addictive. 284 In 1988, the surgeon general concluded
that "[tlhe pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine
tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to
drugs such as heroin and cocaine." 285 Smokers agree: in 2006, 85
percent of smokers reported that cigarettes are addictive.286 If
Medicaid-covered smokers are addicted to nicotine, the viability of a
solution that relies upon Medicaid-covered smokers quitting their
addictive habit is dubious.
One way of measuring the effect of addiction on a smoker's
ability to quit is cigarettes' price elasticity of demand ("PED"), which
measures the degree to which an increase in price reduces demand for
283. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
284. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:
NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 9 (1988) [hereinafter NICOTINE
ADDICTION], available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/Z/D/_/nnbbzd.pdf. The Surgeon
General's criteria for drug dependence included "highly controlled or compulsive use,"
"psychoactive effects," "drug-reinforced behavior," "use despite harmful effects," "relapse
following abstinence," "recurrent drug cravings," "tolerance," "physical dependence," and
"pleasant (euphoriant) effects." Id. at 7. The addictive nature of tobacco led earlier researchers to
conclude that tobacco use is unfit for economic analysis because addiction is irrational. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (remarking that "a theory based on stable preferences and rational
choice cannot illuminate without some modification" addictive behavior such as smoking);
Gordon Winston, Addiction and Backsliding: A Theory of Compulsive Consumption, J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 295, 314-15 (1980).
285. NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 284, at 9.
286. TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE, supra note 26, at 8 (follow the subheading "Prevelance of
Smoking Cessation Among Adults").
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cigarettes. 287 The PED for cigarettes varies by study. The range is
between -0.14 and -1.23, although most are between -0.3 and -0.5.288
None, though, are zero, indicating that, while demand for cigarettes
may be higher when prices increase than demand for a nonaddictive
product, addicted consumers remain responsive to price increases. 289 A
PED of -0.5 indicates that a 5 percent increase in price results in a 2.5
percent decrease in demand.290 And a PED of -0.3 indicates that a 5
percent increase in price results in a 1.5 percent decrease in
demand.291 By any measure, the demand for cigarettes is inelastic,
though not perfectly so.
The elasticity studies on cigarettes indicate that the proffered
solution is, in fact, a viable one. Perhaps this goes without saying.
Medicaid-covered smokers can quit smoking. Data on quit success
rates confirm this, as well. In 2006, 45.7 million adults were former
smokers.292 Among the population of people who have smoked,
approximately 50 percent have quit.293 The lingering issue, however, is
whether Medicaid-covered smokers should be confronted with the
decision to either quit smoking or pay unlawful de facto premiums for
Medicaid coverage. 294 Moreover, imposing this decision on Medicaid-
287. See, e.g., Alexander Ding, Youth Are More Sensitive to Price Changes in Cigarettes than
Adults, 76 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 115, 116 (2003) (explaining demand elasticity of cigarettes
as the "price elasticity of demand," which "represents the responsiveness of demand to changes
in price"); Dahlia K. Remler, Poor Smokers, Poor Quitters, and Cigarette Tax Regressivity, 94 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 225, 227 (2004) (explaining demand elasticity of cigarettes). A PED of zero
indicates that demand is completely unresponsive to an increase in price, which would be
unusual. Demand in such cases is perfectly inelastic. Ding, supra, at 116. A PED between zero
and one indicates that, while demand is responsive to price, it is not proportionately so: a 5
percent increase in price, for example, leads to a 2 percent decrease in demand (PED = -0.4).
Demand in such cases is inelastic. A PED of one indicates that demand is proportionately
responsive to price: a 5 percent increase in price leads to a 5 percent decrease in demand.
Demand in such cases is unitary. Finally, a PED greater than one indicates that demand is
disproportionately responsive to price: a 5 percent increase in price leads to a 7 percent decrease
in demand (PED = -1.4). Demand in such cases is elastic. Remler, supra.
288. Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of Smoking, in lB
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1539, 1546 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000)
(reviewing studies through 2000). More recent research has found even lower PEDs for cigarettes
in the adult population: -0.15 and -0.19. Ding, supra note 287, at 119.
289. See Remler, supra note 287, at 227 (noting that the PEDs "imply[] that cigarette
consumption is fairly insensitive to price but certainly not completely insensitive").
290. Id. (describing the impact PED has on the relationship between price and demand
changes for cigarettes).
291. Id.
292. TRENDS IN TOBACCO USE, supra note 26, at 8 (follow the subheading "Prevalence of
Smoking Cessation Among Adults").
293. Id.
294. See Jonathan Gruber, Smoking's 'Internalities, REG., Winter 2003, at 55 ("For groups
that are particularly price sensitive, higher pricing is an effective self-control device because it
will have more of the desired effect of reducing their smoking."); David A. Hyman, Tobacco
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covered smokers raises a difficult question: Do states act properly
when they impose such a choice, acting in the best health interest of
smokers, or is this merely a veiled attempt to override revealed
preferences-that is, paternalism gone too far? The answer to this
highly charged question should prove fertile ground for future
scholarship and debate.
V. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the MSA seems like a fair deal struck by
sophisticated parties with relatively equal bargaining power. Big
Tobacco, which for years went without publicly paying a dime to those
harmed by its products, now makes hefty annual payments to all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. This relieves
the burden on innocent taxpayers, who otherwise would continue to
fund the treatment of tobacco-related disease through the states'
Medicaid programs.
Upon closer examination of the substance of the MSA, however,
a different form of transaction appears. Big Tobacco again appears
unscathed. Tobacco companies simply pass the costs of the annual
payments on to addicted consumers, some of whom are on Medicaid.
The additional money that Medicaid-covered smokers pay for
cigarettes merely goes through Big Tobacco as a conduit, on its way to
its MSA-designated destination, the states. As in other contexts, the
step-transaction doctrine should apply to the transactions taking place
between Medicaid-covered smokers, Big Tobacco, and the states.
The troubling part of the transaction arises from the purpose of
the payments, which can be gleaned from the complaints filed by the
states against Big Tobacco. Medicaid-covered smokers, who by
definition are financially and medically needy, make payments for
their own Medicaid coverage. Upon evaluating these de facto
Litigation's Third-Wave: Has Justice Gone Up in Smoke?, 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 34, 42
(1998) ("[W]e are prepared to tax 100 percent of consumers to keep cigarettes out of the hands of
the 2 percent that are underage. The massive disjunction between means and ends is neither
necessary nor proper."); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual
Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 423 (2000) ("Tobacco
regulations, particularly those aimed at directly restricting or prohibiting consumption under
certain circumstances, clearly interfere with the liberty of tobacco-consuming individuals.");
George P. Smith II, Cigarette Smoking as a Public Health Hazard: Crafting Common Law and
Legislative Strategies for Abatement, 11 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 251, 260 (2007) ("With
government actions that seek to not only promote health and prevent injury and disease come
inevitable interferences with personal liberties and economic freedoms."); W. Kip Viscusi, The
New Cigarette Paternalism:, REGISTER, Winter 2002, at 63 (noting that increasing taxes on
cigarettes to provide smokers with incentives to quit would "override the revealed preferences of
smokers on the basis of hypothetical failings in individual choice").
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premiums according to the restrictions put in place by § 1396o of the
Social Security Act, the MSA's violation of federal law becomes
apparent. Medicaid-covered smokers pay de facto premiums for their
Medicaid coverage when, under the Act, most should be paying none
at all.
Perhaps even more troubling is the absence of a solution that
does not involve forcing Medicaid-covered smokers to choose between
continuing their smoking habit and paying unlawful premiums. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services is unlikely to exercise
authority under § 1396c to withhold funds from the states. Doing so
would contradict the supportive and cooperative role the Secretary
plays in the Medicaid program. And these are de facto payments to
begin with: to even recognize the violation caused by these payments,
a court must look beyond the surface of the MSA and apply the
principle that substance should prevail over form. And while
Medicaid-covered smokers have a viable argument to support a § 1983
action, a reviewing court may be hesitant to allow such a claim based
on a violation of a provision that is less clearly a rights-creating
statute than the two paradigmatic statutes. Medicaid-covered smokers
may face a bleak choice: quit smoking or pay unlawful premiums for
their Medicaid coverage.
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